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Abstract 
Nationalism has continued to be prevalent in Japanese society, the legacy of 
Japan’s period of modernization. This thesis examines the relationship between 
nationalism and human rights in Japanese policy, focusing on the question, “​How do 
nationalist organizations in Japan influence government policies related to human 
rights?”​ It begins with a historical analysis in order to determine the remaining influence 
of nationalism in Japanese society at large, before determining the direct influence 
nationalism, through nationalist organizations and individuals, influence Japan’s laws and 
policies. I argue that much of Japan’s policy making is influenced by the nationalist 
movement, and as result, human rights have not been fully realized in Japan.  
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Introduction 
In an August 2018 press conference with Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, UN 
Secretary General António Guterres stated, “​I want to express my deep gratitude for 
Japanese leadership in disarmament, but also in relation to the implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, in the fight against climate change, in the promotion of 
human rights, and in all aspects of UN activities.”  Indeed, Japan has maintained an 1
active role in the UN over the past decades, and has risen to prominence as a liberal 
democracy and one of the world’s largest economies. It has repeatedly stated its 
commitment to strengthening human rights and democracy both domestically and abroad. 
However, Japan’s rhetoric on human rights often does not line up with its actions. 
Numerous UN reports have demonstrated Japan’s shortcomings in human rights, 
highlighting the conditions facing minorities and the lack of any national human rights 
institutions. Internationally, besides its inadequate responses to its war crimes during 
World War II, Japan also deals freely with states known to abuse human rights, and 
resists international pressure to punish them. In many cases, Japan has resisted addressing 
these issues, at times refusing to acknowledge them. Part of the explanation for this lies 
in Japan’s nationalist past and its legacy in the present-day. 
Japanese nationalism grew out of Japan’s modernization in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Initially, nationalism was the state’s tool to centralize power and 
1 ​Guterres, António. "Opening Remarks at Press Conference with Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe of Japan Secretary-General." United Nations. August 8, 2018. 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-08-08/remarks-press-conference-pri
me-minister-shinzo-abe. 
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drive Japan’s development and modernization. Eventually, nationalist ideologies became 
so ingrained within Japanese national consciousness that they were tied to the Japanese 
identity. The corresponding imperial expansion eventually culminated in Japan’s invasion 
of China in the 1930s and broader invasion of East and Southeast Asia and war with the 
United States in the early 1940s. Japan’s defeat and subsequent occupation by the U.S. 
cemented Japan’s place in the post-war international order as a liberal democracy aligned 
with the U.S. However, nationalist ideologies remain part of Japanese societal beliefs, 
which are perpetuated by modern nationalist organizations, most notably Nippon Kaigi, 
and the politicians that belong to them. The deep connections between political officials 
and nationalist organizations and the prominence of nationalist responses to human rights 
issues are what prompted my main research question: How do nationalist organizations in 
Japan influence government policies related to human rights? 
Of course, human rights and nationalism are both larger than individuals and 
organizations, and society plays a large role in legitimizing both of them. At the same 
time, the power of individuals and organizations to influence society cannot be ignored. 
As such, it is the interplay between ideologies and society that needs to be studied in 
order to determine why policies are created the way they are. I also researched a number 
of broader guiding questions in order to understand the context for nationalist 
organizations’ behaviors and beliefs: How does nationalism manifest in Japanese society 
today? What are the goals of contemporary nationalists? What are the methods Japanese 
nationalists use to push their agenda? To what degree does Japanese society inform 
nationalism and government policies, or vice versa? What parts of human rights are 
 
Schoonover 7 
widely accepted in Japan, and which are not, and why? This thesis will answer some of 
these questions in more detail than others, but they all address important factors in 
Japanese society that affect nationalist movements, and contribute to the answer to my 
main research question. 
As a member of the G20, a significant ally of the United States, and an important 
regional actor in Asia, Japan occupies roles in multiple political contexts, all of which are 
related to its domestic politics. As a liberal democracy, Japan’s politics can change after 
any given election. That being said, Japan’s government has been under almost exclusive 
control by the currently ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 1955, aside two 
brief periods of time in the early 1990s and late 2000s. The nationalist wing of the party 
has always held significant sway, due to the party’s organization of policy-making, and 
leads the party under the current Abe administration. As a result, much of Japanese 
politics can be tied to the LDP’s politics, which has been influenced by nationalism for 
the past six decades. Japan’s relationships with its East Asian neighbors, still influenced 
heavily by the memory of World War II, is also impacted by the nationalists in prominent 
government positions, which often undermines attempts at reconciliation and 
relationship-building. Indeed, Japanese nationalists often serve as roadblocks to Japan’s 
full political participation in East Asia, and because their views are not widely discredited 
in Japanese society, they are able to continue influencing Japanese policies. In this thesis, 
I argue that because elements of nationalism are deeply ingrained in Japanese society, 
nationalism continues to be reflected in Japan’s politics, particularly around human 
rights. The structure of Japan’s political system, heavily influenced by the Liberal 
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Democratic Party, and the opinions that are prevalent in Japanese society, allow 
nationalist organizations and its members to have direct influence in Japanese 
policy-making, even if they are not directly supported by the population. As such, 
Japanese policy surrounding human rights is a reflection of nationalist influence in 
Japanese society and government. 
There has been extensive scholarly work done on Japan and different aspects of 
Japanese nationalism, including its history and influences, and there has been a small 
amount of work dedicated to disenfranchised groups in Japan, for example women, the 
LGBTQ community, foreigners, and others. The ‘Japanese identity’ has also often been 
used synonymously with Japanese nationalism, and has been studied in relation to 
Japanese opinions and treatment of non-Japanese others. However, very rarely do 
scholars explicitly mention human rights or the relationship between human rights and 
Japanese nationalism, expect in the context of the Japanese military’s conduct in World 
War II.  
In searching for materials in my research for this thesis, I found virtually nothing 
relating Japanese nationalism to human rights policy, or mentioning Japan’s human rights 
obligations. The most directly related text I did find was a single paragraph in ​Routledge 
Handbook of Culture and Society​.  Organizations like Human Rights Watch include 2
Japan’s obligations and shortcomings in specific country reports, but do not delve into the 
2 Victoria Lyon Bestor, Akiko Yamagata, and Theodore C. Bestor, ​Routledge Handbook 
of Japanese Culture and Society​. (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011), 
161-62. 
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reasons behind such shortcomings.  Otherwise, nationalism and human rights are treated 3
separately in academic work on Japan. In addition, much of the scholarship readily 
available on Japan comes from the West, often positioning Japan as non-Western, 
acknowledging it as a state on par with the liberal democracies of the West. This is not to 
say that Japan is a Western state, but by discussing Japan as culturally non-Western, it 
often amounts to giving Japan a free pass in such ‘Western institutions’ as human rights. 
This thesis makes a unique contribution to the literature because it centers the 
discussion of Japanese nationalism around its relationship to human rights. Rather than 
focusing exclusively on one dimension of Japanese nationalism and society, or on only 
one affected group of people, this thesis takes a holistic approach to delve into the 
relationship between nationalism and politics in Japan as the root of the issues in Japan’s 
policies related to human rights. This thesis also considers political contexts, both 
domestic and international, as part of the driving forces behind the continued survival of 
nationalism in Japan and the reasons for the policies supported by nationalists, rather than 
considering politics to be separate from nationalist influence over society, as much of the 
previous literature does. The goal of this thesis is not to generalize the entirety of 
Japanese society as zealous nationalists, or to single out Japan as the only liberal 
democracy not living up to its human rights obligations. Rather, it is to look at Japan as a 
case study of how a society is an important factor in the way policies are created in any 
given state, and how nationalism affects societies, and by extension policy decisions. I 
believe that in this historical moment, with the resurgence of nationalism and 
3 "World Report 2019: Japan," Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/japan. 
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authoritarianism around the world, it is especially important to explore the relationship 
between nationalism, society, and politics, not only to understand why nationalism 
becomes popular, but also to understand its effects and how to counter the negative ones. 
It is also important to explicitly tie human rights into the discussion of Japanese 
nationalism so that it maintains as much a place in discourse as forces that attempt to 
undermine them. I believe that by bringing human rights into this discussion, their 
position can be strengthened in society and public discourse, which is important right 
now in Japan as well as in East Asian geopolitics generally. 
Much of my research is based in analysis of the modern history of Japan and its 
importance in today’s society. Nationalism in Japan played a central role in Japan’s 
modernization, and its influence over society during that period of time is important to 
understand for any discussion of Japanese society today. In addition, human rights are 
much more recent of a concept in Japan than nationalism, and the tensions that exist 
between them have persisted and grown since the middle of the twentieth century. With 
this context, to get at the influence of nationalism over Japanese policy, I focus on a few 
areas of policy: immigration and refugee acceptance, citizenship, issues of racial 
discrimination, and foreign policy, which includes issues stemming from World War II 
war crimes and policies regarding international relations with other states. As such, I 
draw on recent and current events into my analysis, particularly regarding laws and 
political relations, to explain the relationship between nationalist organizations and the 
government’s policies. This will include news stories, from the West and from Japan, as 
well as information from Japanese nationalist organizations, such as is available on 
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websites, either already translated into English or otherwise by myself, with assistance 
from bilingual speakers of English and Japanese.  
My thesis is thus organized for the reader to first gain a more in depth 
understanding of nationalism, followed by a history of modern Japan and Japanese 
nationalism, Japan’s domestic and international political and societal contexts, including 
contemporary nationalist organizations and agendas, and finally an analysis of how 
nationalism is reflected in Japanese human rights policies. 
Chapter 1 is a literature review that lays a theoretical framework for the rest of 
this thesis. The first part of the review focuses on three different approaches to 
nationalism: primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism. The discussion around 
them goes beyond detailing nationalism, and centers on where nationalism stems from, 
which has a role in shaping nationalism and determining how it manifests in a given 
society. This section also addresses what it means to be a nation, and how it differs from 
the state, as well as its relationship with ethnicity. The second part focuses on literature 
that addresses the Japanese identity, and how and why it formed the way it did. Identity is 
an important part of nationalism generally, and concerns about it are extremely prevalent 
in Japanese nationalist discourse. A discussion of Japanese identity is necessary in order 
to apply the theoretical framework of nationalism to the specific Japanese context and 
distinguish this thesis as a case study of the much larger topic. 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the history of modern Japan and Japanese 
nationalism. The chapter starts in the mid-nineteenth century, around the end of the 
Tokugawa shogunate, and progresses chronologically until the late twentieth century, 
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detailing Japan’s imperial expansion and eventual defeat in World War II, and Japan’s 
post-war recovery and rehabilitation into the international community. It then delves into 
that historical context to address the origins of Japanese nationalism, including the ways 
in which and reasons why it manifested in early modern Japan. This chapter ends with an 
analysis of what elements of nationalism are still prevalent in Japanese society today. 
Chapter 3 addresses Japan’s contemporary political and societal contexts. It 
begins with an overview of the Japanese political system and a brief political history, 
including those of the Liberal Democratic Party, since it has been in power for most of 
the post-war era, followed by an overview of Japan’s political positionality on a regional 
and global scale. The second part of the chapter addresses today’s Japanese nationalist 
organizations, primarily Nippon Kaigi, as the largest and most prominent one, looking at 
their reach, methods, and agendas. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 I analyze how nationalist influence is apparent in Japanese 
policies, specifically in relation to human rights. It details various government policies, 
including immigration and citizenship, racial discrimination, education, and foreign 
policy, and how they affect human rights issues prevalent in Japan today. In particular, it 
examines the relationship between these policies and the nationalist movement in Japan, 
in order to demonstrate the prevalence of nationalist influence in Japanese policy-making. 
This includes which human rights are or are not addressed by the government, regardless 
of which human rights treaties Japan is party to. The analysis primarily focuses on these 
policies by examining their nationalist nature, as well as efforts by nationalist 
organizations to encourage or maintain them. In addition, I analyze these policies’ impact 
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on human rights in Japan, the relationship between human rights and Japanese society at 
large. 
In my conclusion, I summarize my findings on the relationship between human 
rights and the systemic nationalist influence on government policies. I also examine the 
possible avenues for change and the strengthening of human rights in Japan and East 
Asia, as well as the limitations of and possibilities for expanding upon this research.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
Nationalism in Japan was forged with a strong relationship between the nation 
and identity, and both of these concepts are necessary to understand in order to fully 
explore Japanese nationalism. To develop an understanding of nationalism in Japan, this 
chapter explores different theories about nationalism, which will inform my own 
understanding of Japanese nationalism as it has developed. This is crucial for an 
exploration of how nationalism has influenced and become ingrained in Japanese society 
today. This discussion intersects with discussions on the nation and ethnicity, all of which 
are important concepts in understanding identity in modern Japan. The Japanese national 
identity developed alongside nationalism in Japan’s modern era, and that identity remains 
a strong force in society today and an important tool of Japanese nationalists, and 
therefore influential in politics. As such, I also review the scholarship that answers what 
the Japanese identity is and how it became that way. 
The first part of the review focuses on the different theoretical approaches to 
nationalism: primordialism, ethnosymbolism, and modernism, represented by Clifford 
Geertz, Anthony Smith, and Ernest Gellner, respectively, as well as defining the nation. 
These approaches differ on their understanding of the relationship between nationalism 
and the nation. After explaining the different approaches, I apply them to the Japanese 
context in order to determine which approach fits best. The second part thus addresses the 
Japanese national identity and how it was shaped by Japanese nationalism. I focus on the 
works of two authors, Delmer Brown and John Lie, in order to examine the development 
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of Japan’s national identity, and to determine whether nationalism still plays a role in 
society today. 
 
The Nation and Nationalism 
Before discussing nationalism in a meaningful way, it is necessary to first 
understand “the nation.” The nation is commonly thought to be an interchangeable term 
for the state, but the differences between them are distinct enough to require clarification. 
The state is defined as a political unit that encompasses the people within a given 
territory. In contrast, the nation is a community based on an intangible, psychological 
bond that connects a given people and differentiates it from all others, based on some 
shared sense of culture.  In this way, a state may encompass multiple nations, or a nation 4
may be spread across multiple states. There are a few states, however, whose borders 
mostly coincide with the territory of a nation and may be labelled as a nation-state, in 
which the differences between the terms are unimportant.  Japan is one such state, as one 5
of the most ethnically homogeneous states in the world. 
Nationalism is tied to the nation, rather than the state, although in the case of 
Japan can apply to both. The modern Japanese state and the Japanese nation developed 
alongside each other starting from the late nineteenth century, and as such Japanese 
nationalism is intricately tied to the state. To understand this relationship and the nature 
of Japanese nationalism, I draw from three theories on nationalism, each based on the 
4 Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a …," In 
Nationalism​, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 36-37. 
5 Ibid., 39. 
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works of one representative author. The first is primordialism, as promoted by Geertz, an 
anthropologist, who argues that nationalism arises from the basic historic attachments 
between people of the same community. The second, modernism, is promoted by Gellner, 
a philosopher and social anthropologist who describes nationalism as a product of 
societal elites in the modern era. Finally, ethno-symbolism as argued by Smith, a 
historical sociologist, promotes the idea that there is a relationship between the elites and 
the people of a given ethnic group, based on the group’s shared culture and history. 
According to Geertz, nationalism arises from the ‘primordial attachments’ that 
bind together a community of people. A primordial attachment is 
one that stems from the ‘givens’ - or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably  
involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ - of social existence: immediate 
contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems 
from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular 
language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social 
practices. These congruities… are seen to have an ineffable, and at times 
overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.  6
In essence, the connections to one’s community as a result of being born into it are 
perceived to be natural and are given an immense amount of importance because of that 
perception, whether it is truly natural or not. These important ties give rise, Geertz 
argues, to the sense of nationhood that nationalism is built from. In this sense, 
nationalism is derived from the nation, rather than a driving force of nation-building. 
6 Clifford Geertz, "Primordial and Civic Ties," In ​Nationalism​, edited by John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 31. 
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Gellner, however, argues that instead the opposite is true, that nationalism is what 
creates a nation where it did not exist before. For Gellner, nationalism is a product of 
modernity and industrialization, rather than a natural process connected to a nation.  7
Modernization creates “standardized, literacy- and education-based systems of 
communication,” which Gellner refers to as ‘high cultures,’ which are used by 
nation-building elites as the impetus of a nationalist movement. While nationalism draws 
on historical cultures, it transforms them, even if it claims otherwise, and reshapes a 
modern society loosely based on a presumably shared past. As such, Gellner defines 
nationalism as “the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low 
cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the 
population.”  In this way, nationalism shapes not only the culture of a people, but also 8
their beliefs about their own culture, even when those beliefs are not founded on 
historical actuality. As a result, nationalism creates sentiments that become  political 
principles when the nation overlaps with the state, and as Gellner describes it, “a theory 
of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across 
political ones.”  The national community is constructed and shaped by nationalist 9
sentiments, and establishes what it means to belong to that community. 
The ethno-symbolist approach of Smith combines aspects of primordialism and 
modernism, placing focus on both the nation and its history. For Smith, the nation, and by 
extension nationalism, is based on ethnicity, or the ​ethnie​, which he defines as a “named 
7 Ernest Gellner, ​Nations and Nationalism​, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 39. 
8 Ibid., 53-56 
9 Ibid., 1 
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human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one 
or more common elements of culture, including and association with a homeland, and 
some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites.”  According to Smith, the modern 10
nation is the result of pre-modern ethnic groups, and as such are based in those groups’ 
cultures and symbols. Nationalism, too, is a modern movement that is based on a group's 
shared history and culture, and is defined by Smith as “an ideological movement for 
attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy of a social group some of whose 
members deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation.”  While the process of 11
nation-building occurs around the core ethnic group, nationalism is the foundation of a 
modern nation. History is the connection between modern nationalism and primordial 
attachments that Smith argues is missing from the other theories of nationalism, and as 
such nationalism as a phenomenon runs concurrently with nation-building. 
These approaches to nationalism were developed with a European frame of 
thinking about nations and nationalism, and as such need to be applied specifically to 
Japan to determine their applicability. Geertz’s primordial approach depends on a sense 
of organic community that exists before the emergence of nationalism. In Japan, 
however, the Japanese identity is a relatively modern development, only becoming a truly 
national consciousness under the nationalist direction of the Meiji era (1868-1912).  12
Primordialism, therefore, does not adequately explain Japanese nationalism. 
10 Anthony D. Smith, ​Myths and Memories of the Nation​, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 13. 
11 Ibid., 18 
12 Delmer M. Brown, ​Nationalism in Japan​, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1955), 9. 
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That leaves the debate between modernism and ethno-symbolism. According to 
Gellner’s modernist approach, nationalism would not have taken root in Japan before 
modernization and industrialization. Indeed, prior to Japan’s modern era there was a 
much lesser degree of national consciousness, and under the Tokugawa shogunate 
(1600-1868) individuals were more likely to identify with their local domain, rather than 
“Japan.” After the Meiji Restoration (1868), the emperor and the oligarchic elites 
embarked on a program of centralizing the government and the nation. Broad 
education-based efforts, as well as the implementation of state shinto, among other 
modernization efforts, were used as tools for spreading an ideology focused on loyalty to 
the emperor, based on ancient Japanese beliefs and customs.  This occurred as part of the 13
Meiji government’s state-building process, which tied the Japanese nation to the Japanese 
state. Even today, Japanese nationalism is espoused largely by societal elites in the 
government and private sector, and its principles are largely consistent with Meiji era 
nationalism. 
However, Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach also has merit in the Japanese 
context. While there was little broad national consciousness, the foundation for the 
modern Japanese nation was built up over 1500 years. Geographically, Japan was largely 
isolated for most of its pre-modern history, which allowed for the development of internal 
unity over time. Japan was also mostly isolated culturally, with the exception of the 
relatively late introduction of Buddhism, resulting in homogeneity in race, language, and 
religion.  There were also periods of time in which national consciousness was 14
13 Ibid., 101-03.  
14 Ibid., 6-8. 
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heightened, such as in the face of Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century.  The 15
emperor has served as an especially important symbol of the nation as well. Even though 
there were times when the emperor was not politically important or powerful, the 
imperial line has, according to legend, never been broken since the first emperor, 
Emperor Jimmu, in 660 B.C. This is according to the first written historical record in 
Japan, the ​kojiki​ (Record of Ancient Matters), finished in 712 A.D.  While the historical 16
accuracy of the ​kojiki​ has not and likely will never be proven, it serves as a shared 
cultural symbol, which unifies the Japanese ​ethnie​. The roots of modern Japanese 
nationalism can be found in the nation’s ancient history, even if it did not exist in its 
current form before modernization. 
For this thesis, I believe that Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach best describes the 
nature of Japanese nationalism. Japanese nationalism is a modern invention, of course, 
but I agree with Smith that history provides the basis for modern nationalism. The 
elements necessary for the creation of the Japanese nation were present in Japan for 
centuries before the advent of modernization. Even though the unified ethnic and national 
consciousnesses was not present until the modern era, historical processes furthered its 
development up until that point. At the beginning of modernization, nationalism was 
developed and popularized by the elites in the Meiji government. Elements of modern 
nationalism, drawn from past cultural elements, remain in Japanese society, especially 
ideologies around race, language, and culture, and societal elites still engage in 
nationalism as it was promoted during modernization. Ethno-symbolism covers both the 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 16. 
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historical and modern factors of nationalism, and thus is best suited to fit the case of 
Japan’s nationalism. 
 
Japanese National Identity 
The second part of this review is dedicated to exploring how and in what ways the 
Japanese national identity developed in order to understand how it has impacted modern 
Japanese society. As mentioned above, there was no concrete national Japanese identity 
prior to the modernizing reforms of the Meiji government. These reforms were a product 
of state-run nationalism intended to shape the new Japanese identity in ways that 
centralized national authority under the emperor. While the Japanese identity has 
somewhat evolved since the early twentieth century, many elements of identity in 
Japanese society today are remnants of Meiji nationalism. I draw from two authors who 
have written on Japanese nationalism and identity: Brown and Lie. Brown wrote 
extensively on Japanese nationalism and identity soon after the end of World War II, and 
his work addresses much of the nationalist influence on Japanese identity between the 
Meiji Restoration and the lead-up to war in the 1940s. Lie addresses the pre-war 
influence, but also describes the redevelopment of the Japanese identity in the post-war 
era and its impacts on society today. 
Brown’s work details the formation and emergence of Japanese national identity 
and nationalism over the long course of Japanese history. His argument claims that the 
societal elements necessary for nationhood and nationalism were present in Japan from 
early on in history, and that it was shaped over periods of unity and disunity in the 
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Japanese islands.  In his historical analysis, Brown claims that by the time of the Meiji 17
Restoration, the Japanese nation was prime for development through modernization. The 
Meiji reforms served to do more than just the centralize the government, but also unified 
the Japanese people under a single national identity. These reforms were widescale and 
affected all aspects of the Japanese nation and state: politically, militarily, economically, 
and culturally. 
Brown describes the different reforms in detail and explains their impact on 
Japanese unity. Soon after the Restoration, the central government set about abolishing 
the Tokugawa political system. This included abolishing former class distinctions, 
centralizing the military under imperial control, thereby taking autonomy away from the 
local ​han​ (domain) leaders, and ultimately abolishing the ​han​ and replacing them with 
ken​ (prefectures). Beyond erasing the former political order, it also politically united the 
Japanese people and paved the way for a single political identity.  The emperor also 18
further established the military under the imperial control with a rescript in 1882, and “by 
continuous effort along these lines, the samurai code of ethics (​Bushido​) tended to 
become the code of ethics for all loyal citizens of the Japanese state,” and ​bushido 
became a powerful unifying force for the army and society as a whole in giving service to 
the emperor.  Economically, the government was heavily involved in economic 19
expansion, and the subsequent industrialization brought about a greater degree of social 
unity, due to the centralized investment of capital. Under the state-led economic growth, 
17 Ibid., 9. 
18 Ibid., 94-96. 
19 Ibid., 98. 
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there was no emergence of a “middle class” and any private investment was backed by 
the government, allowing the political and economic elites to maintain centralized control 
of the economy.  The government also sought to increase ideological unity among the 20
Japanese people by tying the ancient Shinto religion directly to emperor as the traditional 
head of the religion and by extension the state. State Shinto, and religion more broadly, 
was used to enforce national ideology of loyalty to the emperor.  Finally, education 21
reform played a critical role in Japan’s modernization and unification. The state built a 
system of universal education, which drastically increased literacy rates, and aside from 
‘scientific’ education that was imported from the West, also focused on ‘moral’ education 
that enforced piety and loyalty to the emperor and the nation, which further unified the 
Japanese people ideologically.  22
According to Brown, the combined impact of these reforms was to develop a real 
sense of nationhood and ‘national essence’ in Japan. Nationalism continued to influence 
the national identity and be influenced in return as they developed together. Ideas about 
the Japanese ‘national essence’ were broadly propagated in the more literate society, 
especially giving voice to the old values of Shintoism and Confucianism.  The 23
Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) , the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) , and general 24 25
antagonism from the West further served to increase Japanese social solidarity as time 
20 Ibid., 100. 
21 Ibid., 101-103. 
22 Ibid., 103-06. 
23 Ibid., 113-18. 
24 Ibid., 127-28. 
25 Ibid., 142-44. 
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went on, according to Brown.  This gradually built up leading up to the Second 26
Sino-Japanese War and World War II, under the direction of nationalist political and 
academic elites. From Brown’s historical analysis then, the Japanese identity prior to 
World War II was centered on loyalty to the emperor and by extension, the Japanese 
nation. This loyalty was based on race, with Imperial edicts frequently recalling the 
loyalty of the nation’s ancestors and the importance of continuing on that legacy in the 
nation that had arisen in the Japanese archipelago. 
Lie also describes the importance of the pre-war nationalist reforms and 
developments in shaping the modern Japanese identity, although to a lesser extent. The 
centralization of power in Japan during the Meiji era was certainly crucial to fostering a 
sense of nationhood, according to Lie.  Also important were Japan’s new interactions 27
with foreign states after centuries of near isolation from outside contact. The arrival of 
Western states and the opening of Japan gave the nation definable others with which to 
compare itself and crystallize differences into its identity, especially in the face of the 
threat posed by Western imperial powers.  The nation- and state-building efforts of the 28
Meiji government were focused on modernizing Japan to be able to defend itself from the 
established world powers, which further led to Japan’s own imperialist pursuits. 
However, Lie argues that during this imperialist period in Japan’s history, the 
sense of Japanese identity ​included​ the peoples they colonized, and that the empire, while 
based on Japanese ideology, was not believed to be ‘monoethnic.’ While the imperial 
26 Ibid., 144-46. 
27 John Lie, ​Multiethnic Japan​,  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 
119-20. 
28 Ibid.  
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project was pursued with a belief in the superiority of the Japanese ethnic group, the 
national identity of Japan was inclusive of the other ethnic groups in the empire: 
Okinawan, Taiwanese, and Korean by the end of the Meiji era. For Lie, these two ideas 
were not incompatible and were widespread in early modern Japan, even though these 
societies were subject to forced assimilation in to Japanese culture.  This would mean 29
that the Japanese nation, at least prior to World War II, was not tied to the Japanese 
ethnicity. The nation was still tied to the state, however, and at that point the state was 
self-perceived as ‘multiethnic,’ yet still Japanese in nature. 
According to Lie, the more recent Japanese identity finds its roots in the post-war 
period, specifically in the ‘1955 system,’ the political situation that was created with the 
formation of the LDP and its subsequent dominance in politics, where many 
contemporary features of ‘Japaneseness’ find their roots. Lie acknowledges that 
continuities exist between pre-war and immediate post-war Japanese society, but the 
changes were far more drastic. In pre-war Japan, the two main obstacles to national 
consciousness were regional diversity and status hierarchy, and in the post-war era both 
were substantially eliminated. Belonging to the Japanese nation became more important 
than belonging to a certain region, and decreased income inequality, combined with an 
egalitarianism born from the ‘total war’ mobilization of the early 1940s, led to a decline 
in status hierarchies.  By the 1960s, Japan had rapidly modernized, with significant 30
influence from the six years of American military occupation.  Ultranationalism almost 31
29 Ibid,. 122-23 
30 Ibid., 126. 
31 Ibid., 129. 
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entirely collapsed, and political power was taken from the emperor and given to the 
National Diet, marking the transition between monarchy and democracy, and societal 
attitudes about the previous centers of life, the family and the community, shifted towards 
a Western-style nuclear family and home ideal.   32
As a result of this modernization and ‘Americanization,’ Japan experienced rapid 
economic growth, which led to a period of relative prosperity. During this time, the 
Japanese began to question what it meant to be ‘Japanese,’ which at the time did not have 
a meaningful answer.  What arose from this period of reflection was a new sense of 33
Japanese identity, one informed by a new Japanese nationalism and right-wing ideology. 
The Japanese nation became defined by its monoethnicity, as a unique nation with an 
ethnically and culturally homogenous population, and remarkable as a result.  This 34
narrative of Japan became popularized through ​nihonjinron​ (theories on the Japanese), an 
academic field dedicated to explaining the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese society 
and culture that was especially popular in the 1970s.  This belief in a homogenous 35
nation, tied to both the state and the Japanese ethnicity, has persisted until today, and has 
helped nationalists regain power that they lost after the war. 
Lie argues that this nationalist ideology gained popularity precisely because it is a 
new, different kind of nationalism than existed in the pre-war era. According to him, after 
the war, everything related to the old nationalism was shunned, and even though 
nationalists remained vocal, they were hardly influential. Early on in the post-war era, 
32 Ibid., 125-26. 
33 Ibid., 129-30. 
34 Ibid., 130-31. 
35 Ibid. 
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elements of the LDP even attempted to restore pre-war nationalism, to no avail.  As 36
such, the new nationalism was different in that it was what pre-war nationalism was not. 
As opposed to the old multiethnic nationalism, the new nationalism was monoethnic. 
Instead of focusing on the emperor or the old militaristic Japanese spirit, it focuses on 
Japan’s success in economic recovery and prosperity under a pro-Western, capitalist 
society.  For Lie, the new Japanese nationalism is a response to the old nationalism, 37
running counter to it in a (successful) attempt to redefine the nation. Therefore, while 
there are some continuities between pre-war and post-war Japanese nationalism and 
society, there are significant differences that have drastically changed Japan’s national 
identity. 
I find that both authors have merit in their commentary on Japanese national 
identity, but I think that Brown’s historical analysis provides points that counter some of 
Lie’s assertions. Granted, Lie wrote with more historical hindsight than Brown, but much 
of the research has also corroborated Brown’s claims. Primarily, I argue that Lie 
discounts the importance of nationalism in pre-war Japanese society in shaping Japanese 
national identity and its legacy in the post-war era. While it is true that anything 
associated with pre-war nationalism is shunned even today, it established the foundation 
on which post-war society was built. The racism that was institutionalized during the 
pre-war era was part of what drove Japan’s imperial pursuits and the forced assimilation 
policies implemented against colonized peoples, which are evidence of Japanese efforts 
to homogenize the multiethnic empire. Pre-war nationalism was inextricably linked to the 
36 Ibid., 132-33.  
37 Ibid., 133-34. 
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state-building process, and that process was informed by the racial superiority of the 
Japanese people over its neighbors, which is also a key aspect of post-war nationalism, 
according to Lie himself. In addition, while today’s nationalism seems different to the 
wider population, nationalists maintain the same goals of restoring parts of pre-war 
Japan, which is discussed more in a later chapter. The current belief in a monoethnic 
nation is also part of pre-war nationalist influence, as that the racism of post-war 
nationalism stems from the Meiji state-building project. Overall, the ‘new’ nationalism of 
the post-war era, including all its effects on society, is not new at all. Rather, it is the 
same pre-war nationalism refitted for a new political and societal context, with the goal 
of partly returning to the Japanese nation of the past. 
 
Conclusion 
Nationalism was a driving factor in the formation of the Japanese national 
identity, and continues to play a role in national identity today. During the Meiji era, 
nationalism was used to establish a new Japanese national consciousness, constructed and 
promoted by the elites at the time, based in an ethnic and cultural history of the Japanese 
people. Under this nationalist project, the Japanese identity was tied to both the Japanese 
ethnicity and the state. Today, nationalism is still promoted by political and economic 
elites, and even if the population does not broadly agree with their platform, nationalist 
influence is still visible in societal beliefs. This is clearly visible in the popular belief in 
Japan as a monoethnic nation, despite the presence of a small but significant minority 
populations. This belief is rooted in nationalist ideology that is left over from the pre-war 
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era and is racist at its core, perpetuating a belief in innate Japanese racial superiority, and 
was able to appeal to the population by appealing to a sense of economic success in the 
post-war era. The Japanese identity has been constructed and reconstructed since the 
beginning of its modern era, and nationalism has played a role throughout. 
Using the literature, it is important to define what Japanese nationalism 
encompasses. For this thesis, Japanese nationalism consists of a belief in the superiority 
of the Japanese nation, which can be used interchangeably with race or ethnicity, over 
others, and this nation is centered on the emperor, the symbol of an innate and immutable 
shared Japanese culture. This nationalism is driven and promoted by the societal elite, 
drawing on Japan’s history in order to shape public ideologies on the Japanese identity, 
and these elites have an interest in maintaining Japan as a monoethnic nation. 
Nationalism in Japan is best summarized by a 2005 statement by current Deputy Prime 
Minister (and former Prime Minister 2008-09) Taro Aso, in which he described Japan as 
“one nation, one civilization, one language, one culture, and one race, the like of which 
there is no other on this earth.”   38
Having established a framework for nationalism and the Japanese national 
identity, the next chapter provides historical context for Japanese nationalism. Historical 
context is important for understanding why Japanese nationalism developed the way it 
did, and why it affected Japanese society so profoundly. In providing context, the next 
38 ​"Aso Says Japan Is Nation of 'one Race'," The Japan Times,  October 18, 2005, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/10/18/national/aso-says-japan-is-nation-of-one-
race/#.XJgujJhKhPZ. 
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chapter also details the nationalist elements still present in society today, beyond the fact 
of its ongoing presence in political discourse.  
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Chapter 2: History of Japanese Nationalism 
As Japanese nationalism developed over the course of modern Japanese history, it 
is important to understand context for its development. Japan’s modern history was 
shaped by a state focused on building itself up to a level of equality with the European 
and American imperial powers, which determined much of Japan’s behavior leading to 
the mid-twentieth century. Nationalism played a dual role before World War II, serving 
both to establish a Japanese national consciousness and to position itself in relation to the 
West. This transition to the modern era was defined by societal transformation brought 
about by political changes, which were themselves responses to the imperialist influence 
of other powers. Nationalist forces directed these changes from the elite levels of political 
and academic society, and shaped not only the modern era, but also the memory of past 
eras in order to influence the broader population. Japanese nationalism gradually shifted 
over time, eventually reaching the level of ultranationalism in the 1930s that led to war 
and defeat, and eventually returning under the economically prosperous post-war 
Japanese society. 
This chapter addresses the evolution of Japanese nationalism through Japan’s 
modern era, from the mid-nineteenth century until the late twentieth century. The analysis 
describes Japanese nationalism in its different stages and provides historical context for 
its characteristics, split into four periods of time: the years leading up to and through the 
Meiji era, the Taisho era, and the Showa era,  split into the pre-war and wartime period 39
39 The names of the different eras correspond with the posthumous names of the emperors 
that reigned during that time.  
 
Schoonover 32 
and the post-war period. The chapter ends with an analysis of the ways in which the 
influence of nationalism is present in Japanese society today. 
 
Historical Context 
Pre-Meiji and Meiji era (~1850-1912) 
Prior to modernization, Japan was governed by the Tokugawa shogunate, a feudal 
military government that had secured control over Japan in 1600. The shogunate 
maintained a policy of ​sakoku​ (closed country), keeping Japan almost entirely isolated 
from the rest of the world, with the exception of the Dutch, who were allowed access to a 
single port, and limited trade with neighboring countries, and also included keeping 
Japanese people from leaving Japan. This policy remained in place for over two 
centuries, until the arrival of Commodore Perry from the United States in 1853, with the 
mission of opening Japan up to trade with the U.S.. Perry’s arrival served as a catalyst for 
the end of the Tokugawa shogunate and the ‘restoration’ of the emperor to political 
power in Japan.  40
With the arrival of Perry and his ‘black ships,’ the shogunate was left with a 
decision on continuing Japan’s isolation or submitting to the American demands, in the 
face of superior military technology. The shogunate’s decision to open Japan and sign a 
treaty with the U.S. led to other European imperial powers, namely France, Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Russia, rushing to sign treaties of their own with Japan. These treaties 
40 Japan had been experiencing elements of political and social upheaval well before the 
arrival of Perry, and the Meiji Restoration had a variety of causes, but Perry’s arrival 
served as an effective catalyst for the rapid change that occurred in the 1850s and 1860s. 
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left Japan essentially at the mercy of the Western powers economically, and these 
‘Unequal Treaties’ resulted in an intense conservative reaction against the shogunate.  41
The Imperial Court itself was opposed to the shogunate’s decision to open Japan to the 
Western foreigners, and the shogunate slowly lost legitimacy among the elites in 
Japanese society. The emperor gradually gained political independence and influence as 
the shogunate was weakened, and anti-foreign sentiment continued to rise. Ultimately, 
this tension led to brief conflict in 1868 between the shogunate and clans supporting the 
emperor, culminating in the shogunate’s surrender and the Meiji Restoration in 1868.  
Following the Restoration, the emperor and the governing elites that had 
supported him understood that without drastic changes, Japan would remain unequal to 
the West and subject to their demands. The new government set about trying to 
renegotiate the Unequal Treaties, but continued to be blocked by the Western powers, 
“who insisted that they would not give up their privileges before the legal and political 
system of Japan could provide adequately ‘modern’ protection of their rights.”  The 42
inequality between Japan and the imperial powers of the West served to keep Japan from 
participating in equal relationships in foreign affairs. The government needed to bridge 
that inequality in order to protect its own interests. 
It was at this historical moment that Japanese nationalism began to take its 
modern form. The emperor needed to centralize power in order to maintain his authority. 
In fact, the Restoration had not even been considered a particularly important event to the 
41 Christopher ​Goto-Jones, ​Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction​, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), ​16-17. 
42 Ibid., ​43. 
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majority of the Japanese population at the time.  In order to strengthen the emperor’s 43
legitimacy, the governing elites set about centralizing all aspects of Japanese society in 
order to establish a discernible, united Japanese nation.  
This project of centralization was critical to building the modern Japanese state 
and constructing the modern Japanese national identity. Prior to the Meiji Restoration, 
even under the somewhat centralized power of the shogunate, there had yet to be a 
unified “Japanese” identity; rather, Japanese identities were based more on one’s local 
domain.  To remedy this, Japanese leaders and scholars imported knowledge and 44
technology from the West and basing the state-building process on Western conceptions 
of the state.  In order to foster the belief in a “Japanese” nation, the Meiji government 45
focused on centralizing power under the emperor and reforming society into the mold of 
a Western state.  
As previously discussed, these reforms included wholesale political and social 
organization, centralizing military authority and the education system, and industrializing 
Japan’s economy. The first reforms included abolishing former class distinctions and 
centralizing the military authority under the emperor, and replacing the old Tokugawa era 
domains with new provinces, thereby erasing part of the former basis for local identity.  46
The establishment of the National Diet served to further centralize political power in the 
government, as opposed to local elites. Cultural elements of the past were used by the 
Meiji government to reinforce the emperor’s authority, especially ​bushido​, the codes of 
43 Ibid. 
44 John Lie, ​Multiethnic Japan, ​118. 
45 Christopher Goto-Jones, ​Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction​, 48-51. 
46 Ibid., 94-96. 
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honor for the samurai , and Shinto, the ancient religion of Japan.  The government also 47 48
involved itself in the economic affairs of the state, ensuring that the economy was 
modeled after the West.  The state also built a new education system, providing a 49
standardized universal education to the population and standardizing the Japanese 
language to further unify the nation.  By the 1890s, the Meiji reforms had modernized 50
Japan enough to be able to renegotiate its treaties with the West, and establishing itself as 
the first modern Asian country.  51
In addition to modernizing domestically, the Meiji government started to become 
its own imperial state, modeling itself after the Western powers. The first territorial 
expansion overseen by the Meiji state was when Hokkaido, previously belonging to the 
native Ainu population, was declared to be imperial land in 1873.  Next was the Ryukyu 52
Kingdom, which had previously been an independent state and later a tributary to both 
China and Japan. Japan invaded the Ryukyu Islands in 1872 and later annexed them in 
1879 and reorganized them into Okinawa province. This was met with resistance from 
the Ryukyuan population, although Japan’s power was superior enough to maintain 
control. The conquest of Okinawa was a significant step on Japan’s road to empire, as it 
was considered to be the first step towards claiming more islands to the south later on.  53
47 Ibid., 98. 
48 Ibid., 101-103. 
49 Ibid., 100. 
50 Ibid., 103-06. 
51 Ibid., 43-44. 
52 John Lie, ​Multiethnic Japan​, 91. 
53 Ibid., 96-98. 
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Over the next three decades, Japan also fought wars with China and Russia, and 
managed to secure territory on the Asian mainland. Japan was in heavy competition with 
China for influence over the Korean Peninsula in the late nineteenth century, and the 
tension between Japan and Korea, which favored China, eventually led to the First 
Sino-Japanese War in 1894. By 1895, Japan had defeated China with its more 
modernized military, and established exclusive influence over Korea and taking Taiwan 
and the Liaodong Peninsula from China as part of reparations. Soon after, Russia, France, 
and Germany insisted that Japan vacate the Liaodong Peninsula, which it did, only for 
Russia to occupy the peninsula and other European states to take advantage of a 
weakened China to occupy different port cities. Tensions between Japan and Russia 
eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. Japan soundly defeated Russia, 
which was the first time a non-European power had defeated a European state in the 
modern era, establishing Japan as more or less equal in power to the other modern states, 
as well as further influence over a weakened China. Japan took this opportunity in 1905 
to occupy Korea as a protectorate, and later formally annexing it in 1910. With this, 
Japan secured territory on the mainland, a dominant position in Asian regional politics, 
and a seat at the table in international political affairs. 
During the Meiji era, the main role for nationalism in Japan was to build a 
national consciousness in order to drive the state’s modernization efforts forward. This 
was in itself a response to the outside pressure placed on Japan by the imperial powers of 
the Europe and the United States. These foreign states interacted with Japan on an 
unequal level, demanding unfair treaties and exercising their superior power to secure 
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their own interests. In effect, Japan’s interactions with foreign powers was a driving force 
of the growth of nationalism; the Unequal Treaties were viewed as a humiliation to the 
Japanese, and the lack of respect afforded to Japan by the West contributed to a national 
sense of inferiority and the need to establish Japan with an equal status, led by the 
governing elites.  
The result was to model Japan’s state-building efforts on Western states, 
importing knowledge and technology and applying it towards modernization. By the time 
of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan had become a fully modern state, with enough power to 
defeat China and establish influence over East Asia. The war with China had been 
popular, gaining support from the population after dissatisfaction with the seemingly 
excessive expense and privilege of the military, and the belief that they were 
demonstrating their equality with the Western powers.  Even so, Japan was still treated 54
unequally in the aftermath of the war, as demonstrated by the ‘Triple Intervention’ 
regarding the Liaodong Peninsula, to which the Japanese took great offense. The 
Europeans’ refusal to treat Japan as a modern nation, with the exception of Britain, 
seemed to be purely racist, deeply frustrating the Japanese. Thus, nationalism in Japan 
became focused near the end of the Meiji era on ensuring Japan’s dominance in Asia and 
equal recognition from the other imperial states in response to foreign pressures. 
 
54 Christopher Goto-Jones, ​Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction​, 66. 
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Taisho era (1912-1926) 
The death of Emperor Meiji in 1912 marked the beginning of Emperor Taisho’s 
rule for a relatively brief 14 years. The Taisho era is known for being a period of 
development and democratic values. Japan had already been mildly democratic, although 
suffrage was only available for the wealthiest men; the right to vote was expanded 
somewhat in this period. The further democratization of Japan led to a shift in power 
from the old Meiji oligarchs to the political parties in the National Diet. In turn, policies 
more popularly supported by the people, including a smaller military budget and overall 
demilitarization, were advanced in the new political climate. Japan also experienced an 
economic boom during World War I in Europe, and a middle class emerged. With 
democratization and economic prosperity, Japanese society gradually became more 
Westernized and liberalized than during the Meiji era.   55
Abroad, Japan managed to make strides in its pursuit of equal membership in the 
European community of nations. In World War I, Japan entered the war on behalf of its 
ally, Britain, taking German colonial possessions in China and the Pacific. For its 
contributions to the Allied war effort, Japan was given a seat at the table in the Versailles 
peace talks, in which it was allowed to keep the territory it took during the war. Japan 
was also granted a permanent membership on the Council of the League of Nations. This 
served as a source of pride in Japan, where people were enthusiastic about the recognition 
given by the Europeans and the United States. However, the racial equality clause the 
Japanese delegation proposed as an amendment to the League of Nations charter was shut 
55 Ibid., 72-73. 
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down by the U.S. and Britain (despite the approval of most of the delegations). The 
defeat of the amendment sparked anger among the Japanese people, perceiving it as 
another instance of Western racism, resulting in protests and riots.   56
As time went on, the general prosperity and nature of the Taisho era began to 
decline. The economic bubble created by the war eventually burst, and Japan spiralled 
into depression. This allowed the largest corporations to completely take over the 
economy, which resulted in extreme wealth inequality.  In addition, the political parties 57
in the Diet were limited in their ability to implement policies by the conservative 
military, which still maintained significant political clout that prevented leftist 
movements from strengthening and spreading. By the end of the Taisho era, the 
continued economic troubles, foreign pressures, and ineffective party governments led to 
weakened democracy and a strengthened military in Japan. 
Due to political and societal shifts in Japan during the Taisho era, Japanese 
nationalism also took on a different character than during the Meiji era. The reactionary 
nationalism of the Meiji era was not readily visible in Taisho Japan. Economic prosperity 
at home and increasing prestige on the global stage led to increased national confidence 
and feelings of security. Japanese attitudes were more internationalist than they were 
isolationist. As such, nationalism was not needed to mobilize the nation for competition 
against other imperial powers. Instead, it was geared towards explaining Japan’s 
prosperity and normalizing modernity within Japanese culture. It was not the progressive 
56 Ibid., 74-75. 
57 Ibid., 76. 
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state-building force that it was under the Meiji emperor, nor was it the ultranationalist 
aggressive imperialism of the next two decades. 
 
Showa era (1926-1945) 
The Showa era began with the ascension of Emperor Hirohito (posthumously 
Showa) amid the economic downturn and the political instability of the mid 1920s. The 
inability of political parties to deal with economic and foreign affairs continued to 
contribute to the decline of the parties and the democratic process in Japan. The critical 
blow was the Great Depression, which quickly and dramatically damaged the Japanese 
economy. The population became increasingly frustrated with the political parties, and 
the 1930s began with a period of political violence that saw the assassinations and 
attempted assassinations of several high profile political leaders, including prime 
ministers.  Popular discontent with the parliamentary governments paved the way for the 58
military to gradually gain control over Japanese government and society.  
The military had been at odds with the party governments since they had risen to 
power during the Taisho era, and their competing aims drove the military to take as much 
power as they could during the 1930s. For a while, the military had believed that ​Japan 
needed to prepare for total war in order to ensure victory in future conflicts, which would 
include being able to mobilize the Japanese civilian population and economy towards any 
war effort, which they learned from Germany’s defeat in the World War I. ​However, the 
party-led governments had been more concerned with growing the economy and 
58 Ibid., 76-77.  
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engaging peacefully in the post-war international system, and as a result did not provide 
the military with the funding it desired, nor was the military satisfied with the parties’ 
priorities. The marginalization of military interests also exacerbated tensions between the 
navy and the army, as they were forced to compete for funding. The combined tensions 
with the party governments and between the two branches of the military contributed to 
the frustration of military officers, which was largely directed at the political parties and 
the institution of party government in general.  As a result, the weakness of the parties in 59
the early 1930s motivated military leaders to increase their control over government in 
order to pursue their own priorities. 
The military had already been in a powerful enough position in the government 
by 1930 that it was able to take more control after the failure of the political parties. By 
law, the ministers of war and the navy were active military officers of their respective 
branches, which meant that higher ranking officers maintained control over their 
ministers in the cabinet, and were somewhat able to influence military policy.  In the 60
early 1930s, the political turmoil and international issues set the stage for the military’s 
larger role in governance and society at large. In 1931, army officers in Manchuria 
orchestrated an attack on their own railroad in order to blame Chinese troops and initiate 
an invasion and subsequent occupation of Manchuria, which became known as the 
‘Manchurian Incident.’  While not sanctioned by the government or head military 61
officers, the invasion dragged Japan into international conflict, which gave the military 
59 Ann Waswo, ​Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994​, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 83-84. 
60 Ibid., 79-81. 
61 Christopher Goto-Jones, ​Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction​, 78. 
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more authority in the affairs of the state. Young officers also took action to restore 
political authority to the emperor by participating in the assassinations of political 
leaders, and by the time the higher ranking officers reestablished control over the 
insubordinate troops, the military had ​de facto​ taken control of the government through 
supra-cabinet bodies that had been established to create closer contact between the 
military and the government.  62
The turmoil in domestic politics led to issues in Japan’s foreign affairs as well. 
Following the occupation of Manchuria, Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo 
to maintain control over its new territory. The League of Nations was quick to condemn 
Japan’s actions, prompting Japan to leave the League and thereby isolating itself from the 
international community and becoming more reliant on its own military strength.  63
Japan’s international situation resulted in the military continuing to grow in strength, 
which meant that it was more free to pursue its own agenda. Under the military’s 
leadership, Japan once again invaded China in 1937, escalating the conflict that had 
began in Manchuria, and allying itself with Nazi Germany and Italy in World War II. 
During the war, Japan invaded Allied colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, under the 
pretext of liberating other Asian peoples and uniting them under the ‘Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere,’ but in reality only replacing European with Japanese rule, which 
was often repressive and brutal, and the Japanese military committed numerous atrocities 
that continue to haunt Japan. Japan later attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor in 
December of 1941, attempting to keep the U.S. from entering the war, which backfired 
62 Ann Waswo, ​Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994​, 82-86. 
63 Christopher Goto-Jones, ​Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction​, 78. 
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and ultimately led to Japan’s defeat with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August of 1945.  
Japan was driven to war largely because the military used its power to instill 
nationalist sentiment in the broader Japanese population in order to gain support for its 
war efforts. The escalation of conflicts abroad in the 1930s allowed the military to gain 
more and more power, without public resistance, through the supra-cabinet bodies, which 
became the real centers of government power during the wartime period.  In addition, 64
with greater influence over government, military officers began to serve as cabinet 
officials and prime ministers, effectively replacing the political parties as the drivers of 
domestic policy.  Following the escalation of conflict in Manchuria, the military acted to 65
control the media in relation to military issues, requiring official approval before 
publication. The military also moved to garner widespread public support for its war in 
China, which included the “spiritual mobilization” of the people for the war effort, as 
well as the censorship and elimination of anti-war ideologies.  The military utilized State 66
Shinto once more, using the emperor as a symbol in order to unite the Japanese 
population into a single body, which would make it easier to control and mobilize for the 
war effort.  The military’s control of the population resulted in a period of widespread 67
ultranationalist sentiment across Japanese society that became deeply tied to the nation’s 
war effort and ingrained in the national consciousness of the time. 
64 Ann Waswo, ​Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994​, 86. 
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Showa era: post-war (1945-1989) 
Following the war, Japan was immediately occupied by the United States from 
1945 to 1952, and this period saw major transformations of Japanese national institutions. 
The 1890 Meiji Constitution was replaced with a new constitution, which simultaneously 
relegated the emperor to a ceremonial role by transferring all real political authority to the 
National Diet, and completely abolished Japan’s military. The Allies also oversaw the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East from 1946 to 1948, which put Japan’s 
wartime leaders on trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The trial has been 
criticized, like its predecessor, the Nuremberg Trials, for being a form of victor’s justice 
over the defeated Japan. Many of Japan’s political leaders were found guilty of war 
crimes, including former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, who was ultimately executed. 
Notably, however, U.S. General MacArthur kept the tribunal from trying Emperor 
Hirohito, despite evidence that he was directly involved in the wartime decision-making 
processes. MacArthur felt that the emperor was a necessary symbol, without whom it 
would be difficult or impossible to govern Japan, although some scholars have claimed 
that sparing the emperor from punishment undermined democratization efforts in Japan.  68
Ultimately, MacArthur’s plan was to eliminate fascism and militarism from Japanese 
public life, implementing multiple other reforms in order to foster a more liberal and 
democratic sentiment in Japanese society. 
With the beginning of the Cold War, however, the goals of the occupation began 
to shift in order to better aid U.S. interests in Asia. As the political left strengthened in 
68 Christopher Goto-Jones, ​Modern Japan: A very Short Introduction​, 91-93. 
 
Schoonover 45 
Japan (with help from some of Macarthur’s own reforms), the U.S. became concerned 
with the spread of communism instead of fascism, and set about suppressing left-wing 
political movements. Relatedly, the Japanese economy was suffering from extreme 
inflation, which also concerned U.S. officials about Japan’s potential to fall to 
communism, and thus, the occupation’s agenda included strengthening Japan’s economy 
to secure U.S. interests in Japan as a bulwark against communism in Asia.  69
Rather than U.S. policy, however, it was the Korean War (1950-1953) which 
strengthened Japan economically and pushed it even closer into the U.S. sphere of 
influence. Even though Japan could not directly participate in the fighting, materially 
assisting the U.S. and allied war effort resulted in a massive economic boom for Japan, 
which was able to rapidly increase its exports and production, and brought about rapid 
economic growth.  Japan also began to somewhat remilitarize in 1950, under the 70
direction of the U.S. occupation authorities, which ultimately evolved into the 
Self-Defense Forces in 1954, which is not formally a military force, but remains in place 
to defend Japan from attack. The Korean War also ultimately brought about the end of 
the U.S. occupation. In order to fully establish Japan as an ally in the Cold War, the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, signalling Japan’s rehabilitation into the 
international community and formally ending the occupation in 1952, and the U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty was signed the same day, cementing Japan’s relationship with the U.S. 
that continues to this day.  The San Francisco Peace Treaty was controversial at the time, 71
69 Ibid., 97-98. 
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and continues to have international repercussions today, which will be detailed in the next 
chapter. 
Following the Korean War, and with its new independence, Japan began to take 
steps to strengthen its economy, which resulted in what is commonly referred to as an 
‘economic miracle.’ In 1950, Japan’s GNP was 11 billion dollars, and by the end of the 
war had increased by 250%.  Further government spending led to a massive boom in 72
industry, and GNP tripled between 1960 and 1971, and Japan became the third largest 
economy in the world at the time.  This constituted a dramatic change in Japan’s 73
condition, having been exceptionally weak economically just after the end of World War 
II. 
Up to this point, nationalism had been severely weakened in the post-war era, 
having no real foothold in public discussion. Japan’s defeat had shattered the societal 
self-confidence that nationalist fervor had instilled in the public, and anything relating to 
the nationalist attitudes of the militaristic past was shunned.  This is not to say it did not 74
exist at all: Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who had been arrested and held as a Class A 
war criminal suspect (but never tried), attempted to return Japan to its more nationalist 
past, including attempting to revise the 1947 constitution and to reinstate pre-war 
nationalist symbols, such as the Rising Sun Flag and the Imperial national anthem, 
kimigayo​, which garnered significant opposition from Japanese society.  Most 75
72 Ibid., 98.  
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significantly, his revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which aimed to increase 
Japan’s responsibility for its own military defense, was met with massive and widespread 
protest from different segments of society, who viewed it as violating Japan’s newfound 
pacifist nature. Although Kishi passed the revised treaty through political manipulation, it 
cost him his resignation as prime minister.  The intensity with which Kishi was opposed 76
demonstrates Japan’s general hostility towards nationalism in the early post-war era.  
However, Japan’s economic growth created an environment where nationalist 
perspectives were once again able to be part of the public discourse. The dramatic shift in 
Japan’s economic strength, coupled with Japan’s security alliance with the United States, 
boosted Japan’s position in the international community, and as such society’s 
self-confidence increased with it.  Nationalists began to promote ideas about the 77
superiority of the Japanese nation and its people as evidenced by its rapid economic 
growth and prosperity. Scholarly writing about Japanese superiority was known as 
Nihonjinron​ (‘Theories on the Japanese’), which had its roots in the early nationalism of 
Japan’s modern era, and in the generally prosperity of the 1960s and early 1970s, it was 
an attractive school of thought for many Japanese readers.  In addition, Japan’s industrial 78
advancement began to attract immigrant workers in the 1980s, mostly from Southeast 
Asia and South America. The pressures of foreign immigration combined with Japan’s 
post-war economic experience once again brought up questions about the Japanese 
identity in societal consciousness, and ​Nihonjinron​ provided answers. This gave 
76 Ibid., 109-10. 
77 Harumi Befu, ​Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of 
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nationalists a platform to promote their platform without the backlash that had been 
present in the early post-war era. Even after ​Nihonjinron​ lost its popularity, the ideology 
it espoused had already settled in the national consciousness, allowing nationalists to 
maintain their position in the public discourse, and their influence continues to this day. 
 
Conclusion 
Japan’s modern history has been defined by cycles of nationalism and national 
development, beginning with the Meiji era. The Meiji leaders of Japan set out to use 
nationalism in order to build a Japanese nation, for the sake of its survival in the face of 
Western imperialism. The nationalism born in the late nineteenth century eventually 
faded somewhat in the aftermath of World War I, only to be replaced by an even more 
aggressive form in the 1930s, which led Japan down the road to total war and eventually 
total defeat. In the post-war era, Japan was able to reconstruct itself, with some help from 
the U.S. occupation, and soon after become one of the most economically prosperous 
states in the world. While nationalism had generally died down in the general public 
during and immediately after the occupation, it survived and reemerged in the 1970s, and 
has steadily remained present in the public discourse since, even if it is not 
wholeheartedly accepted by the majority of society, and remains influential in the 
political sphere. Having now addressed the history of nationalism in Japan, the next 
chapter focuses on its relevance in Japanese society today, and the contexts it exists 
within.  
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Chapter 3: Contemporary Context 
Having established the historical influence and nature of Japanese nationalism, I 
will now address Japan’s current sociopolitical contexts. This chapter begins with an 
overview of the Japanese political system, followed by a political history of Japan in the 
post-war era, which largely overlaps with the history of the Liberal Democratic Party, 
which has been in power for all but five years total since 1955. It then moves on to 
describe other key areas of Japan’s domestic context, particularly exploring its current 
economic situation, as well as the status of women and minorities. The chapter ends with 
an explanation of Japan’s status within its regional and international relationships and 
positions. By exploring Japan’s sociopolitical contexts, it becomes easier to understand 
the stances taken by nationalists and the ways in which they are able to influence 
Japanese politics and society.  
 
Japan’s Political System 
Political Institutions 
Japan’s current political system was established by the 1947 constitution, which 
has remained unamended since its promulgation. Under the constitution, the National 
Diet (​kokkai​) is the “highest organ of state power,” and the “sole law-making organ of the 
State.”  The Diet is split into two chambers, modeled after the British parliamentary 79
system with a Lower House and an Upper House; the House of Representatives and 
79 ​THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, 
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House of Councillors, respectively. Both Houses are required to pass identical pieces of 
legislation before they are made into law, with the exception of the budget, the 
ratification of treaties, and the selection of the prime minister, which all fall under the 
ultimate control of the House of Representatives, making it the more powerful body of 
the two. The prime minister is elected by a majority vote of the members of the House of 
Representatives, typically the ruling party or coalition, and leads the executive branch. 
The prime minister has the power to appoint members of the cabinet, who may or may 
not be members of the Diet, and the cabinet puts forward legislation for the Diet to vote 
on. The Supreme Court has the power of judicial review to determine the constitutionality 
of laws passed by the Diet, although it has rarely chosen to do so, generally preferring to 
stay away from contradicting the government.  80
 
Election System 
Under the former election system in Japan (1946-1993), members of the Diet 
were elected by single non-transferable vote (SNTV), in which voters cast one vote in a 
district that would elect several representatives. There was no limit to how many 
candidates could run for a party, except limits placed by party resources. The current 
election system was established in 1994, aimed at fixing issues of malapportionment and 
misrepresentation. This system is organized into a parallel system of semi-proportional 
representation: single-seat constituencies and party-list proportional representation. In 
single-seat constituencies, one member is elected by popular vote in a local constituency. 
80 David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1425 
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In 11 multi-member constituencies, voters choose a party, and members are selected from 
party-provided lists of candidates based on the proportion of votes cast for each party. 
The House of Representatives consists of 465 seats, 289 of which are elected from 
single-seat constituencies and 176 that are elected by proportional representation, and 
members serve for four years, although the prime minister has the power to dissolve the 
Lower House and call a general election at any time. The House of Councillors has 242 
members, and each serve a six year term. Half of the members (121) are elected in each 
election every three years, 73 of whom are elected from the prefectural districts and 48 of 
whom are elected from a national party list by proportional representation. 
The Japanese election system also relies heavily on a politician’s personal 
connections to people and their access to money. The LDP has maintained a strong 
advantage on both fronts, which has allowed them to remain in power almost 
uninterrupted since the 1950s. LDP candidates often maintain loyal bases of voters 
assured to vote for them, relying on their personal connections to members of their 
constituencies. One example of this is the ​koenkai​ (‘local support group’), which operate 
as personal support groups of politicians, primarily in the LDP, to assist with 
campaigning, cultivating support for a candidate, rather than a party. This has had another 
consequence in creating various political dynasties, in which family members are able to 
inherit these support systems. Large sums of money flow through these support systems 
and campaigns in general, which has created an environment of corruption, which 
reforms have attempted to tackle over the past couple of decades, to varying results.  81
81 J. A. A. Stockwin, ​Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy​, (Oxford: 
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Organizations (i.e. industries and companies) loyal to candidates or parties also mobilize 
in elections to generate support for their chosen candidate, which also disproportionately 
benefits the LDP.  The evolution of Japanese electoral politics will be detailed later in 82
this chapter. 
 
Policymaking 
When it comes to policy making and agenda setting, scholarship has been divided 
on where the true power lies in Japanese governance. The government, led by the cabinet 
and prime minister, obviously has the final say on whether policy is instituted and bills 
are brought to the Diet. However, when it comes to the actual drafting of policies and 
bills, the bureaucracy does most of the work. Each ministry is largely independent from 
the others, save for the ministers that report to the prime minister, and each has its own 
interests to protect in creating policy.  Relatedly, each ministry deals with different 83
industries, and a relatively independent bureaucracy has fostered an issue of regulatory 
capture, in which bureaucrats create policies that are supported by industries they are 
supposed to oversee, and then retire from government and land powerful positions at 
companies they previously regulated (​amakudari​, lit. descent from heaven).  This has 84
given corporations and other powerful interest groups relative control over the 
policymaking process of Japan. 
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Post-war Political History and LDP Success 
In the immediate post-war period, the Allies (primarily US) held the role of the 
ultimate authority in Japan, while taking steps to reinstitute Japanese self-governance 
through the new constitution. The occupation set the stage for the Japanese political 
landscape for the next few decades. For example, General MacArthur, while overseeing 
the occupation, initially backed the formation of a Japanese labor movement, but as 
tensions rose with the Soviet Union, later became interested in suppressing the left in 
order to limit the spread of communism.  The impact has been a consistently weak 85
Japanese political left and the dominance of the political right. 
In 1955, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party merged, creating the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) and beginning almost 40 years of continuous government 
control, which came to be known as the 1955 system. Stemming from the merger of 
parties, the LDP was and continues to be comprised of multiple factions, which cycle 
through the party presidency/Prime Ministership, and as a result has never held a 
completely uniform party platform, beyond general conservatism and anti-communism 
and anti-leftism more broadly. The LDP has also never been popular, rarely garnering 
public approval rates above 50%.  That said, the LDP was able to draw consistent 86
support from rural constituencies to maintain their governing majority, in large part 
85 Yong Wook ​Lee, "The Origin of One Party Domination: America’s Reverse Course 
and the Emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan," ​The Journal of East Asian 
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because of the kinds of policies it pursued. Even without a cohesive platform, the LDP 
engaged in pork-barrel politics that directed funding and development projects to rural 
communities. 
The 1955 system also saw the gradual decline of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
which served as the most influential organization of the Japanese political left and the 
traditional head of the opposition to the LDP. As the LDP maintained its hold on power 
in government, it was able to weaken the JSP by passing policies that prevented the left 
from establishing itself in a strong position to govern at all.  As Japan experienced 87
dramatic economic growth and prosperity through the 1960s and 70s, the JSP was also 
unable to convince the electorate of its proposed economic policy changes, and by 
extension political transfer of power. 
The LDP also held an advantage over other parties in the previous Japanese 
election system. Under the previous system, the LDP had the ability and the party 
infrastructure to run several candidates in every constituency, ensuring that they were 
able to maintain a majority in the Diet. Personal networks were important to distinguish 
LDP candidates from each other, and this system consistently elected multiple LDP 
candidates per district.  Other parties lacked the resources to run in every district, let 88
alone several, preventing any major opposition force from emerging and maintaining 
itself.  An opportunity for reform came in 1993, when the LDP briefly lost its majority 89
in the House of Representatives, and a coalition government comprised of 8 parties was 
87 Ibid., 19-20. 
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able to pass comprehensive election reform, establishing the current system. The 
coalition quickly fell apart afterwards, and the LDP was able to regain its position in the 
government in the next election in 1994. The LDP was also able to effectively destroy its 
formerly most important opponent by entering into a coalition with the JSP in 1994, 
giving them the first prime minister since 1948, while every cabinet post was filled by a 
member of the LDP. This coalition served as the end of the JSP, weakened to the point of 
ineffectiveness by the LDP and mass defections. However, the changes to the election 
system remained in place, and it was hoped that the new system would allow for a 
two-party system to emerge and supply meaningful opposition to the LDP. While it did 
result in fairer representation in the Diet, the LDP was still able to retain its grip on 
power. 
By the late 1990s, the LDP was again facing significant opposition from the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had formed during the 1996 general election. 
The general public was also becoming eager for political reform, in the face of economic 
stagnation that the LDP had yet to fix. In order to remain in power, the LDP elected 
Junichiro Koizumi as prime minister in 2001, a ‘maverick’ who immediately set about 
reforming the LDP in an attempt to adapt it for the new national electoral landscape, 
threatening to destroy the LDP if it refused reform. Koizumi broke the mold of the LDP’s 
traditional factional consensus-making style with loose party discipline by pushing his 
own policy agenda, primarily privatization of the postal service, contrary to the general 
lack of clear LDP policy. When his postal reform failed in the Diet, Koizumi dissolved 
the House of Representatives and refused to nominate members who had voted against 
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his policy and instead brought in new candidates that pledged to support him. As a result, 
Koizumi’s tactics and subsequent popularity resulted in a landslide victory for the LDP, 
with which he was able to push through his agenda.  After his retirement, however, the 90
LDP reverted back to its old methods, and three ineffective prime ministers (including 
current PM Shinzo Abe) and three years later, public dissatisfaction cleared the way for 
the DPJ to take power in 2009. 
The DPJ won on a platform focused on eliminating the corruption that had set in 
under the LDP, primarily by reducing the role of the bureaucracy in creating policy and 
increasing the role of elected Diet members in the cabinet. While the DPJ was able to 
reduce the power of the bureaucracy, the result was inexperienced cabinet members 
unable to effectively create policy and an inability to address the rest of the party’s 
platform.  After three prime ministers in three years without a general election, the LDP 91
was returned to power in 2012, and Shinzo Abe was re-elected as prime minister, a 
position he has held since. The LDP has also governed in coalition with the Komeito, a 
smaller conservative party, in order to maintain a supermajority in the Diet. 
On their return to government, the LDP continued with their previous methods of 
policy making, although Abe has also pursued his own agenda, primarily rooted in 
nationalist ideology, which will be detailed later in this chapter. Abe has focused on 
staying in power, calling elections at moments of weakness for the opposition. The most 
recent election as of this writing, the 2017 General Election, kept Abe and the LDP in 
power and led to a significant party realignment. A large portion of the DPJ split into the 
90 Gregory W. Noble, ​"The Evolution of the Japanese Policymaking System," 256. 
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Constitutional Democratic Party, and the remainder eventually merged into a new party, 
and a rival conservative party, led by Tokyo governor and former cabinet member 
(during Abe’s first term) Yuriko Koike, the Party of Hope. Koike formed the Party of 
Hope as a response to Abe not being hardline enough in foreign affairs, and although the 
party was largely unsuccessful in the election (due to poor campaigning), Koike 
generated significant public excitement and popularity at the start of the campaign.   92
 
Domestic, Regional, and International Contexts 
Domestic/Societal Context 
Although Japan remains one of the world’s largest economies, it has been 
experiencing economic stagnation since the 1990s. 1991 saw the beginning of a 
deflationary period that lasted over 20 years that resulted in significant shrinking of the 
economy. Japan is continuing to recover from its economic woes, currently led by Prime 
Minister Abe and his economic policies (referred to as Abenomics), a combination of 
monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms.  While the economy has begun 93
growing modestly and consistently in recent years, inflation has remained lower than the 
government’s goal, and Japan’s future economic prospects are weak, hampered by 
demographic changes and issues of discrimination. Japan’s population has begun to 
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shrink in recent decades, as a result of a declining birthrate, which has, coupled with an 
increasingly aging population, created labor shortages and a large economic burden on 
younger workers to care for the elderly members of society, which is only projected to 
get worse.  94
Women 
Women in Japan are subject to societal expectations that limit their abilities to 
participate as fully in the economy as men. The structure of Japanese society generally 
relies on men to work in order to provide for their families, and while women may work 
part-time for extra income, they are generally expected to take care of the family as a 
housewife. Women are not barred from working by law, and many work in professional 
settings, although their jobs are still often gendered in nature, but once they are married 
and have children, are expected to quit to stay in the home. As a result, women have a 
significantly lower economic participation rate than men.  In addition, women hold very 95
few top positions in private companies, and have very little representation in government, 
holding only about 10 percent of seats in the Lower House and 20 percent in the Upper 
House.  96
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https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/07/national/japan-fails-shine-annual-report-
womens-participation-politics/#.XJfX1ZhKhPY. 
 
Schoonover 59 
Ethnic Minorities 
The Ainu are the indigenous people of northern Japan, having lived there for 
thousands of years. The Ainu struggled against the ethnic Japanese people for centuries to 
preserve their land against Japanese expansion, and remained autonomous well into the 
Tokugawa era. In the early nineteenth century, the shogunate claimed control over the 
rest of Ainu territory as a protectorate, and did not pursue any policies directly against the 
Ainu. However, the Meiji government declared the land to be part of Imperial Japan, and 
proceeded to colonize the territory with their own population. This displaced native Ainu 
populations and the Ainu population declined significantly by the end of the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth. The Meiji government also pursued an aggressive 
assimilation agenda against the Ainu, attempting to incorporate them into the Japanese 
population. This included policies to criminalize their culture, forced relocation, forced 
adoption of Japanese names, and overall the destruction of the Ainu way of life. 
Exploitation of the Ainu continued well into the twentieth century, even in the years 
following World War II.  97
The legacy of forced assimilation continues today in the official and societal 
attitudes toward the Ainu. The word ‘Ainu’ itself became a pejorative term, and they are 
principally seen as a less than civilized people and commonly discriminated against, 
particularly in marriage and other social situations. The government briefly recognized 
the Ainu as a separate culture in 1950, but rescinded it in 1953 until 1987, effectively 
ignoring their existence. The effect this had on society is demonstrated by how little 
97 John Lie, ​Multiethnic Japan​, 89-93. 
 
Schoonover 60 
Japanese people know about the Ainu; as of 1993, only one of over twelve high school 
textbooks surveyed even mentioned the Ainu, and many Japanese people believe them to 
be nearly extinct. The disenfranchisement and neglect of the Ainu people have left many 
of them in poverty, with low levels of educational achievement among the Ainu 
population. As a result of the stigma surrounding the Ainu, only recently has there been a 
movement for Ainu pride, which has actually resulted in an increase in the Ainu 
population, only because more and more of them have been willing to identify as such, 
although that pride has not had much of an impact on mainstream Japanese society.   98
The Ryukyu people, now commonly referred to as Okinawans, also face a similar 
erasure by the Japanese government, although in a somewhat different context. The 
Ryukyu Islands were formerly an independent nation until they were annexed by the 
Meiji government in the 1870s as Okinawa province. The Okinawans were subject to a 
similar assimilation campaign by the Meiji government, driven in part by a belief that 
Okinawans were already essentially Japanese; the Okinawan language was considered a 
dialect of the Japanese language, despite evidence to the contrary, and was banned, as 
were other aspects of Okinawan culture. Despite the Japanese government’s efforts to 
integrate Okinawans into Japan, and even after successfully changing Okinawans’ 
self-perceptions to view themselves as Japanese, they still were subject to discrimination 
in mainland Japan. In the eyes of Japanese people, Okinawans were still a minority that 
were inferior to the Japanese, and as a result were discriminated against in employment 
and wage earnings. In World War II, derogatory attitudes towards Okinawans remained, 
98 Ibid., 93-94. 
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and in the battle of Okinawa, over a fourth of the Okinawan civilian population died, with 
evidence to suggest that the Japanese military convinced or forced many Okinawans to 
commit suicide rather than surrender to the U.S. government, which remains a 
contentious issue today.  99
After World War II, Okinawa was occupied by the U.S. until it was returned to 
Japan in 1972. This presence of the U.S. military in Okinawa, and the tensions 
surrounding it, fostered anti-American sentiment among the Okinawan population, which 
continues today and is ignored by the Japanese government in its dealings with the U.S., 
which contributes to tensions between Okinawa and the Japanese government. Ironically, 
since the end of the U.S. occupation, there has been a shift in Okinawan sentiments 
regarding their own identity separate from Japan, while Japanese people have come to 
view Okinawans as Japanese, a reversal from the pre-war era.  This contributes to the 100
erasure of the Okinawans’ unique cultural and ethnic identities, as well as their separate 
desires and needs from those of mainland Japan, which the national government also 
continues to ignore. 
Ethnic Koreans have a more recent presence in Japan, but they face similar 
struggles to other ethnic minorities. After Japan colonized the Korea at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the government once again pursued the assimilation of their new 
subjects into the empire. During the colonization period, many Koreans migrated to Japan 
to fill the demand for cheap labor, but despite the official policy of ‘Japanization’ on the 
Korean Peninsula and the official status of Koreans as Japanese subjects, they were still 
99 Ibid., 95-99. 
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disliked and considered inferior by the Japanese population. Even so, the Korean 
population in Japan increased rapidly, numbering around 348,000 in 1920, and increasing 
five times more by 1939. The state recruited more Korean workers, sometimes 
conscripting forcefully, for the war effort during the 1930s; by 1944 the Korean 
population in Japan reached its height of about 2.4 million, with about half of them 
estimated to have been forcefully relocated.  101
After the war, about two-thirds of the Korean population returned to the Korean 
peninsula, the rest remaining for various reasons, some outside of their control, 
concentrated in pockets of communities. However, their Japanese citizenship was 
stripped from them after the war, and as Japan does not adhere to citizenship by birth, 
their descendants are also considered foreigners. The lack of citizenship left ethnic 
Koreans ineligible for government and corporate jobs, leaving them in relative poverty, 
and in the 1950s were considered the most disliked group in Japan.  Even though there 102
have been improvements in the condition of ethnic Koreans in Japan as time has gone on, 
and many younger Koreans have become naturalized citizens, they still face 
discrimination in society, and often hide their ethnic identity to avoid discrimination in, 
for example, employment or marriage. 
Foreign Workers 
Foreign workers make up a significant portion of the non-Japanese population, 
and also are on of the most frequent subjects of public discourse about foreigners. Most 
foreign workers are from Southeast Asia or South America, and migrate to Japan for 
101 Ibid., 105-107. 
102 Ibid., 107-109. 
 
Schoonover 63 
lower wage jobs that Japanese workers themselves do not want, often ‘3K jobs’ (​kitsui​, 
kitanai​, and ​kiken​, or difficult, dirty, and dangerous). This migration began in the 1980s, 
following its economic boom, and the influx sparked debate in the media about whether 
or not Japan should accept so many foreigners into the country. Even as more and more 
Japanese people accepted that as a wealthy country, there would be more foreign 
immigration, the debate continued as to what it meant for Japan’s national identity and 
culture if more non-Japanese people continue to live in Japan, despite the fact that foreign 
workers make up a miniscule portion of Japan’s population.  103
 
Regional Contexts 
Much of Japan’s regional geopolitical position in East Asia in recent decades has 
stemmed from its role as an aggressor in World War II, especially in its relations with 
China and the Koreas. Following the war, Japan initially only reestablished relations with 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) in 1952. Neither the People’s Republic of China nor 
either of the Koreas were invited to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty.  As a result, 104
relations with the People’s Republic of China were not normalized until 1971, and 
relations with South Korea were normalized in 1965, after almost 15 years of tension in 
attempting to resolve issues left over from Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. In more 
recent years, recurring issues continue to plague Japan’s relationships with China and 
Korea, particularly regarding territorial disputes and differences in historical memory. 
103 Ibid., 15-19. 
104 Kimie ​Hara, "50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and 
Japan’s Territorial Problems," ​Pacific Affairs ​74, no. 3 (2001): 361-82, 
doi:10.2307/3557753, 370-375. 
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Territorial Disputes 
The dispute with South Korea over the island of Dokdo/Takeshima remains 
unresolved because it was not specifically mentioned in the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
in resolving territorial issues. South Korea maintains official control over the islands, but 
both countries dispute each others’ claims to the islands, and the U.S., which is in the best 
position to mediate the dispute, has yet to take a side. South Korea also still uses the 
“MacArthur Line” that administratively separated Takeshima/Dokdo from the rest of 
Japan during the occupation, even though the line ended with the occupation, making it 
more difficult to resolve the dispute.  With regard to China, Japan is in dispute over the 105
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, northeast of Taiwan. The Japanese claim the islands as part of 
Okinawa prefecture, and while their possession was never specified by treaty, it was 
generally accepted that the islands were part of Okinawa, and the U.S. accepted that 
claim during their administrative control over Okinawa. However, the Republic of China 
refused to recognize Japan’s claim over Okinawa entirely, and the People’s Republic of 
China began to claim the islands after the reversion of Okinawa back to Japan.  Both of 106
these disputes are part of the legacy of Japan’s colonial period, as well as U.S. influence 
during the post-war occupation, and the remaining tensions make resolutions difficult and 
continue to be sore spots in diplomatic relations. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 376 
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Historical Memory 
Another issue in Japan’s relations with its neighbors stems from conflicts over 
historical memory of Japan’s imperialist past. In China, this issue stems mostly from the 
war crimes committed by the Japanese military during World War II, especially the 
Nanking massacre, while Korea’s issues extend to Japan’s colonial rule over the 
peninsula. The main tensions revolve around Japan’s refusal to properly acknowledge its 
responsibility for or pay reparations for its actions. In China, this is primarily in relation 
to the Nanking Massacre, while in Korea the “comfort women” issue takes center stage. 
Even though Japan has acknowledged its responsibility through the San Francisco Treaty, 
there are nationalist elements of Japanese society, including in the ranks of politicians, 
that deny either Japan’s responsibility or that the crimes ever occurred, which heighten 
tensions between Japan and its neighbors. Although Japan has issued apologies in the 
past, critics in China and Korea have believed them to be insincere and therefore 
unacceptable.  One element of this issue is how China and Korea often use 107
anti-Japanese sentiment as a political tool to drum up domestic nationalism and support, 
but Japan has also been unwilling to make necessary concessions to put the issue to rest.  
In relation to East and Southeast Asia as a whole, Japan has worked to establish 
itself as a leader in the region. Japan has given billions of dollars worth of foreign aid to 
states in Southeast Asia, and has served as a critical investor in development projects. 
Japan’s involvement in Southeast Asia is meant to establish Japanese leadership, as a 
107 ​Kamiya Matake, “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” In T. ​Japanese 
Foreign Policy Today​, edited by Inoguchi & P. Jain, 226-250. (New York: Palgrave, 
2000), 247-248 
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counter to Chinese influence, in order to secure Japan’s interests and boost its national 
profile. 
 
International Contexts 
Since the end of World War II, Japan has been able to establish itself as a major 
global power, with a strong economy and important relationships with powerful Western 
states. The most important of these relationships is with the United States, which has 
been Japan’s chief ally since the end of the occupation in 1952. Under the terms of the 
security treaty between the two states, the United States has been responsible for Japan’s 
defense needs, and as such has held significant sway with regards to Japan’s relations 
with the rest of the world, especially its neighbors, as described above. Japan’s 
relationship with the U.S. has framed its relations with other states in the context of U.S. 
foreign policy, which was especially important during the Cold War, which is responsible 
for Japan’s alignment with the West as a liberal democracy.  
With a guarantee of defense from the U.S., Japan was able to pursue a foreign 
policy that was primarily focused on economic growth. As a result, Japan was able to 
build its economy to be one of the largest in the world, and maintains membership in the 
G20 (as well as the G7 and G8), keeping a seat at the table where major global economic 
issues are discussed. 
Japan has also worked to develop a global image of importance, as exemplified by 
its relationship with the UN. Under the UN Charter, Japan is labelled as an ‘enemy state’ 
under Article 53, “The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of the Article applies to 
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any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the 
present Charter,” serving as an embarrassment that continues today.  This distinction 108
had consequences during the Cold War for territorial disputes with the Soviet Union, and 
while Japan has lobbied for the removal of the clause, politics has prevented it from 
happening. Japan is also a member of the G4 with Germany, India, and Brazil, a group of 
states supporting each others’ bids for permanent seats on the UN Security Council.  109
Japan’s international influence has increased in the past decades, but faces pushback on 
its membership in the permanent membership of the UNSC from South Korea and China. 
Japan has also nominated a significant number of landmarks and important cultural sites 
to be considered as UNESCO World Heritage status in an effort improve its international 
standing and importance.  110
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has gone over the basic information on Japan’s political system and 
post-war history, as well as the domestic and international political contexts that it 
inhabits today. The issues laid out in this chapter are interrelated, as domestic politics and 
society are invariably influenced by and influence Japan’s foreign relations. Nationalism 
has played a part in Japan’s politics and society throughout the post-war era, even 
108 ​Hitoki Den, "U.N. Charter's Anachronistic Enemy State Clauses," The Japan Times, 
January 19, 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/01/19/commentary/japan-commentary/u-n-ch
arters-anachronistic-enemy-state-clauses/#.XLDhA-hKhPY. 
109 ​"UN Security Council - Profile," BBC News, August 24, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-11712448. 
110 UNESCO World Heritage​ ​Centre, "Japan," UNESCO World Heritage Centre, 
https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/jp. 
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without widespread popularity, and the issues Japan faces in its political situations are all 
influenced to some degree by nationalism. The next chapter will detail the specific 
influence nationalism has had on Japanese policies and the ways they affect human rights 
in Japan as well as in Japan’s foreign affairs.  
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Chapter 4: Japanese Policies and Human Rights 
This chapter delves into specific policies in Japan and their specific impact on 
human rights. First, it addresses the ways nationalism currently manifests itself in 
Japanese society today, specifically through Nippon Kaigi, a prevalent nationalist 
organization. It then details Japanese policies around immigration, citizenship, education, 
and foreign affairs, what they mean for human rights, and the ways in which the 
nationalism more generally is evident in those policies. The chapter then moves into the 
direct influence of nationalist organizations over Japanese policies, and by extension 
human rights. Through this analysis, I answer my main research question: ​How do 
nationalist organizations in Japan influence government policies related to human rights? 
Before delving deeper into human rights in Japan, it is important to define what 
‘human rights’ means in this context. For the sake of this thesis, ‘human rights’ refers to 
those rights defined under the international human rights conventions to which Japan is a 
state party.  Particularly relevant in this thesis are the International Covenant on Civil 111
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racism (ICERD), although this does not mean that the impact of nationalism is 
limited to only these rights. Rather, these conventions are the most relevant to the policies 
that this chapter specifically analyzes, and therefore the most important rights to consider 
in this thesis.  
111 ​"Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, Refugees," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/index.html. 
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Nationalism in Japan Today 
While Japanese society remains influenced by nationalism from the past, most 
Japanese people are unsupportive of overt nationalist sentiments and the nationalist 
agenda.  That being said, organized nationalism remains present in Japan, with over 112
1,000 far right groups comprised of over 100,000 members nationwide. The most 
prominent nationalist organization in Japan is Nippon Kaigi, with about 38,000 members, 
counting among its membership many prominent right-wing academics, former 
politicians, and currently elected LDP politicians, including Prime Minister Abe and most 
of his current cabinet.  113
The Japanese nationalist movement has been built from issues domestically and 
internationally. The following is a list of Nippon Kaigi’s main goals and activities: 
Historical perception related 
● Justify Japan’s war efforts in World War Two 
● Oppose Japanese government making apologies for wars and colonialism 
● Argue against China on Nanjing Massacre and South Korea on “comfort 
women” 
● Pressure legislators to visit Yasukuni Shrine 
 
Education related 
● Promote patriotic education 
● Oppose over-emphasizing citizens’ rights in education 
● Oppose what they call liberal gender education 
● Promote loyalty to the state and emperor 
● Publish and promote school textbooks that fit its views 
 
112 Koichi Nakano, "Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism," ​The 
Asia-Pacific Journal​, 6th ser., 14, no. 20 (October 15, 2016), 
https://apjjf.org/2016/20/Nakano.html. 
113 ​Daiki Shibuichi, "The Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi): An Elusive Conglomerate," 
East Asia ​34, no. 3 (2017), doi:10.1007/s12140-017-9274-1, 184. 
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Amendment of constitution/policy related 
● Rebuild the armed forces 
● Promote the notion of collective self-defense 
● Re-designate the emperor as Head of the State (Kokka-genshu) 
● Oppose the government project to promote gender equality in the 
workplace 
● Oppose giving voting rights to non-citizens 
 
Imperial institutions and Shinto related 
● Legalize the Imperial Calendar (achieved) 
● Commemorate the late Shōwa Emperor 
● Pressure the government so that mourning and accession ceremonies for 
emperors should be conducted in the Shinto style 
● Pressure the government to organize Shinto-style ceremonies to celebrate 
the day when the mythical Emperor Jinmu acceded to the throne as 
Japan’s first Emperor 
● Oppose female emperor as well as female-line succession of emperors 
Custom related 
● Oppose legalizing the system of husband and wife retaining separate 
family names 
 
Foreign relation related 
● Oppose subsidies provided by local governments to resident North Korean 
schools 
● Demand North Korea to return Japanese hostages 
● Demand North Korea to stop developing WMDs 
● Demand China to stop sending government vessels to Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands 
● Demand South Korea to return Takeshima/Dokdo island 
● Demand Russia to return Northern Territories 
 
Others 
● Oppose and criticize leftist/liberal mass media outlets 
● Oppose leftist Japan Teachers’ Union 
● Legalize national flag and anthem (achieved)   114
114 Ibid., 193-94. 
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Nippon Kaigi utilizes a variety of methods in order to advance these goals, relying 
on a grassroots network across the country. This activism includes lecture tours, speeches 
from propaganda trucks, petitions, publishing numerous books on a range of issues 
related to their goals, and (generally unsuccessful) lawsuits to silence those who discuss 
Japanese war crimes.  Generally, Nippon Kaigi and its associated organizations apply 115
pressure on officials at all levels of government to prevent, for example, education 
curriculum, from straying away from their ideology. Most importantly, however, are 
Nippon Kaigi’s connections to LDP politicians. Based on the nature of the Japanese 
policy making and election systems, as described in the previous chapter, access to 
politicians gives organizations significant sway over the workings of the government, and 
Nippon Kaigi is no exception. This influence will be further detailed later in this chapter, 
following a discussion on specific policies maintained by the Japanese government and 
their impact on human rights. 
 
Policies, Human Rights, and Nationalism 
Immigration and Citizenship 
Japanese immigration laws are famously strict, and have changed little since the 
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was passed in 1951. Even in the face 
115 Weiss, Andrew, "Towards a Beautiful Japan: Right-Wing Religious Nationalism in 
Japan's LDP" (2018), Student Work, 7, 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ceas_student_work/7, 14-15. 
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of an aging and shrinking population and workforce, immigration standards, including 
those for workers, have only been slightly loosened.  Various programs exist that allow 116
for short-term low skilled employment for foreign workers, for either 1 or 3 years, and 
most visas are not valid for any longer, which also makes permanent residency difficult 
to attain given a required 5-10 years of residency. This is easier for foreigners of Japanese 
descent (​nikkeijin​), who are given special long term visas. Notably, visas are only 
provided at Japanese consulates or embassies outside, after the applicant is provided a 
Certificate of Eligibility that demonstrates that they are able to provide for themselves in 
Japan, and is not “likely to become a burden on the Japanese Government.” This has 
resulted in low immigration rates through the post-war era, with foreigners making up 
less than 2 percent of Japan’s population.  117
Citizenship is also very selective in Japan, making it difficult for foreigners of 
little means to obtain Japanese citizenship. Under the Nationality Law of 1950, Japanese 
citizenship operates under ​jus sanguinis​ (‘right of blood’), where citizenship is granted 
only if one or both parents are Japanese citizens at the time of birth, meaning a child born 
in Japan to two non-citizen parents is not eligible for citizenship. Otherwise, 
naturalization is available by approval from the Minister of Justice as provided by 
116 ​Simon Denyer and Akiko Kashiwagi, "Japan Passes Controversial New Immigration 
Bill to Attract Foreign Workers," The Washington Post, December 07, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japan-passes-controversial-new-immigration-bill
-to-attract-foreign-workers/2018/12/07/a76d8420-f9f3-11e8-863a-8972120646e0_story.h
tml?utm_term=.078d9b8b235f. 
117 Mark Schreiber, "The Face of Immigration Is Rapidly Changing in Japan," The Japan 
Times, February 17, 2018, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/17/national/media-national/face-immigration
-rapidly-changing-japan/#.XIsIaqBKhPY. 
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Articles 4-10 of the Nationality Law. Article 5, paragraph 1 provides the general 
requirements for naturalization: 
The Minister of Justice shall not permit the naturalization of an alien unless he or  
she fulfills all of the following conditions: 
(1) that he or she has domiciled in Japan for five years or more consecutively; 
(2) that he or she is twenty years of age or more and of full capacity to act 
according to the law of his or her home country; 
(3) that he or she is of upright conduct; 
(4) that he or she is able to secure a livelihood by one's own property or ability, or 
those of one's spouse or other relatives with whom one lives on common living 
expenses; 
(5) that he or she has no nationality, or the acquisition of Japanese nationality will 
result in the loss of foreign nationality; 
(6) that he or she has never plotted or advocated, or formed or belonged to a 
political party or other organization which has plotted or advocated the overthrow 
of the Constitution of Japan or the Government existing thereunder, since the 
enforcement of the Constitution of Japan. 
 
Under item 5, Japan does not allow for dual citizenship with another state. In the case of 
a person who is granted a second nationality at birth, they have until their twenty-second 
birthday to choose one, or two years after acquiring the second nationality if they do so 
after they turn twenty, as provided by Article 14.  118
The combined impact of these immigration and citizenship laws makes it difficult 
for many foreigners to live in Japan and then stay to become citizens and members of the 
nation. In the area of immigration, human rights are significantly impacted by Japanese 
policies in accepting refugees applying for asylum. In 2017, out of over 19,000 
applicants, Japan accepted only 20 as refugees.  In the first half of 2018, it accepted 22 119
118 ​THE NATIONALITY LAW, 
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html. 
119 ​Chisato Tanaka, "Japan's Refugee-screening System Sets High Bar," The Japan Times, 
May 21, 2018, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/21/reference/japans-refugee-screening-syste
m-sets-high-bar/#.XJPDGKBKhPY. 
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of 5,586 applications for refugee status.  The Japanese government claims that such a 120
low acceptance rate stems from the high number of people who are attempting to exploit 
a loophole in Japan’s refugee policies that would allow them to work in Japan, and are 
not truly refugees.  These figures are also somewhat misleading, as the approved 121
applications were submitted years before and had just finished being vetted, according to 
the head of the Tokyo branch of the UNHCR.  Regardless, even if the government’s 122
claims are true and in spite of the fact that the yearly numbers are not correlated, Japan 
accepts very few refugees, especially compared to other advanced countries. 
The fact that there are people attempting to apply for refugee status for the sake of 
work also provides commentary on the state of immigration policies in Japan. Unskilled 
workers are all but banned from living and working in Japan other than temporary 
internship training programs, so their attempts to work in Japan end up somewhat 
inflating the number of refugee applications. That being said, Japan also has an extremely 
strict application system, made harder by immigration policies. In addition to needing a 
visa to enter Japan before arriving, Japan also adheres to strict interpretations of what it 
means to require asylum, and also places a large burden of proof on asylum-seekers, 
120 "World Report 2019: Japan," Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/japan. 
121 Chisato Tanaka, "Japan's Refugee-screening System Sets High Bar," The Japan Times, 
May 21, 2018, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/21/reference/japans-refugee-screening-syste
m-sets-high-bar/#.XJPDGKBKhPY. 
122 ​Tara Francis Chan, "NO ENTRY: How Japan's Shockingly Low Refugee Intake Is 
Shaped by the Paradox of Isolation, a Demographic Time Bomb, and the Fear of North 
Korea," Business Insider, April 11, 2018, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-japan-accepts-so-few-refugees-2018-4. 
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which is difficult for those who were persecuted in their home countries to provide.  123
Japan’s immigration laws compounded with the asylum application system make it 
extremely difficult for refugees to enter and remain in Japan. 
In addition to immigration issues, Japan’s citizenship laws have also made it 
difficult for many long-term residents to have their political rights fully realized. For 
example, the ​zainichi​ Koreans, several generations of which remain in Japan, are unable 
to participate in Japanese civil life, particularly in regards to voting, unless they become 
naturalized citizens. While some local municipalities have allowed ​zainichi​ to vote in 
local elections, they still lack the right to vote in national elections, meaning their 
interests remain unrepresented at the national level. In addition, the stipulation in the 
Nationality Act requiring “upright behavior” in order to be naturalized has been used in 
the past to prolong or reject applications from Korean or Chinese permanent residents.  124
Without the protections of citizenship, non-Japanese residents are subject to 
discrimination and deprived of civil opportunities available to Japanese citizens, which 
will be described in more detail in the next section. 
The nationalist influence in these policies is clearly evident in the unequal 
treatment of foreigners attempting to live in Japan. The difficulties immigrants 
experience in the Japanese immigration system help to perpetuate the small amount of 
123 ​Chisato Tanaka, "Japan's Refugee-screening System Sets High Bar," The Japan Times, 
May 21, 2018, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/21/reference/japans-refugee-screening-syste
m-sets-high-bar/#.XJPDGKBKhPY. 
124 Tetsuro Kobayashi, Christian Collet, Shanto Iyengar, Kyu S. Hahn, Who Deserves 
Citizenship? An Experimental Study of Japanese Attitudes Toward Immigrant Workers, 
Social Science Japan Journal​, Volume 18, Issue 1, Winter 2015, Pages 3–22, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyu035, 5. 
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non-Japanese people in Japan, which in turn perpetuates the belief in an ethnically 
homogeneous nation. The continuation of strict immigration controls runs counter to 
Japan’s demographic changes, with a shrinking and aging population, and by extension, a 
shrinking and aging population. Labor shortages continue, yet the Japanese government 
has made few changes in allowing more unskilled workers to live and work in Japan. 
This stems from the desire of the government (the LDP) to maintain the status quo of a 
‘homogeneous’ Japan, which is also supported by the Japanese public.  This ideology is 125
also present in the special status that people of Japanese descent have in immigrating to 
Japan, even if they have never lived in Japan or do not speak Japanese. The importance of 
‘blood’ in the Japanese immigration system is symptomatic of the larger legacy of 
nationalism in Japan.  
 
Racial Discrimination 
Japan is party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, which requires signatories to outlaw racial discrimination in all its 
forms, including hate speech. Despite being party to the convention since 1974, however, 
Japan still has no laws that prohibit racial discrimination. In addition, Japan interprets the 
treaty as not allowing any law that prohibits freedom of speech, and as such has no laws 
against hate speech either. Multiple UN reports over the years have called for Japan to 
enact such policies, but what little legislation has been passed has lacked any substantive 
measures to prevent racial discrimination or racially motivated hate speech. 
125 Tara Francis Chan, "NO ENTRY," Business Insider, April 11, 2018, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-japan-accepts-so-few-refugees-2018-4. 
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Without concrete legislation against racial discrimination, racial minorities in 
Japan continue to be deprived of full participation in Japanese society. Discrimination 
against non-Japanese people, notably ethnic Koreans, Ainu, and Okinawans, have kept 
minority communities excluded from society and economically disadvantaged. Income 
and education gaps persist and perpetuate a cycle of economic discrimination. Many 
Japanese people believe the Ainu are disappearing or already have, and anti-Korean hate 
speech has been on the rise recently, exacerbated by tensions with North Korea, which 
means that despite the slow progress that has been made over the past few decades, 
minorities face significant obstacles to equal participation in Japanese society. 
Alternatively, Okinawans, who have been labelled as Japanese, continue to struggle 
against the Japanese government for their own recognition. The Japanese government’s 
unwillingness to cooperate with the Okinawan prefectural government on issues of the 
U.S. military bases and the Okinawan identity continues to frustrate the relationship 
between Okinawa and Japan.  
The inequality between ethnic Japanese and ethnic minorities is also part of the 
legacy of modern Japanese nationalism. Ethnicity plays the most important role in the 
marginalization of minorities in Japan, and the discrimination and acts of hate facing 
minority communities is a manifestation of the belief in Japan’s ethnic homogeneity. The 
government’s inaction, even after several reports over the past few decades highlighting 
Japan’s shortcomings in upholding the rights of minorities and demanding efforts to 
improve, are demonstrative of the general attitude towards non-Japanese people. In recent 
years, Governor Koike has declined to send a eulogy to an annual memorial for the 
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Koreans massacred in the aftermath of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, going against 
tradition , and local efforts to limit hate speech have been weak , exhibiting general 126 127
apathy in regards to improving the conditions for minorities. 
 
(History) Education 
Japanese history textbooks are infamous for mischaracterizing, providing few 
details about, or completely omitting Japan’s role in World War II and the atrocities 
committed by the Japanese military. All textbooks require approval from the Japanese 
government (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, or 
MEXT) before they can be published for use in schools, and the Ministry has consistently 
required authors to make edits to their textbooks to downplay Japan’s role as a aggressor 
or deflect blame for the military’s actions. Ienaga Saburo’s lawsuits against the Japanese 
government between 1965 and 1997 for censorship are among the most famous examples 
of history censorship from the Japanese government, but issues persist to this day. In 
addition, while most history textbooks are not overtly nationalistic, the Ministry did 
approve the New History Textbook (​Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho​), written by the 
Association to Write New History Textbooks (​Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho o Tsukuru 
Kai​), in 2001, which was heavily criticized for being extremely nationalistic. 
126 ​"Koike Again Skips Eulogy for Koreans Killed after 1923 Quake: The Asahi 
Shimbun," The Asahi Shimbun, August 09, 2018, 
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201808090043.html. 
127 ​Drew Ambrose and Sarah Yeo, "Kawasaki Hate Speech: The Rise of Japan's Far 
Right," Far Right | Al Jazeera, March 02, 2018, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/kawasaki-hate-speech-rise-japan-180227114
204341.html. 
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The result of these shortcomings in Japan’s history education is a population that 
is not properly educated on the Japan’s imperialist past and does not engage with issues 
of historical memory with China and Korea. The ultranationalist reactions to accusations 
of war crimes against Japan is to deny or minimize responsibility, but the general 
population, even if they accept Japan’s responsibility for the war, does not understand 
why China and the Koreas are still unsatisfied with the Japanese government’s efforts 
towards reparations and reconciliation. With nationalists leading the government, the 
nationalist narrative of the war remains in the mainstream political discourse, and the 
Japanese public’s general lack of knowledge about Japan’s role in the war makes 
international dialogue difficult and enables nationalists to continue their narrative. All the 
while, victims or families of victims of the Japanese military, most notably former 
comfort women or victims of the Nanking Massacre, continue to wait for a proper 
apology and acknowledgement of responsibility from the Japanese government, as well 
as redress to assist with the healing process. 
Nationalist sentiment is strong in this area of Japanese policy regarding history, 
precisely because the leaders of the government hold the same beliefs as prominent 
nationalist organizations. The fact that history textbooks published by revisionists are 
approved by MEXT, such as the New History Textbook, while more accurate textbooks 
are rewritten demonstrates a common interest between nationalists and the government in 
maintaining a national narrative of denial. By denying responsibility for war crimes 
committed by the military, nationalists maintain the narrative of an infallible nation, 
which by extension maintains that Japan’s wartime conduct was justified and denies the 
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importance of the victims’ rights. The issues with Japan’s history education are 
perpetuated by the nationalist leadership of the government, and a population that is not 
fully educated and therefore apathetic, allowing nationalists to remain in power and 
define education standards. Notably, Japanese teachers often do not end up teaching 
much of Japan’s modern history, including the war, for lack of time and importance on 
exams. Wartime history has a lack of importance placed on it in Japanese society, which 
allows for nationalists to keep their position in international debates on historical 
memory. 
 
Human Rights in Japanese Foreign Policy 
Officially, Japan maintains that it pursues “diplomacy based on the fundamental 
values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law.”  In reality, 128
however, human rights has been given low priority in Japanese foreign policy, especially 
compared to other liberal democracies. Japan has maintained political and economic 
relationships, including foreign aid, Japan’s favorite tool of foreign relations, with states 
and regimes that have been known to abuse human rights. Most recently, Japan has given 
support to Myanmar in its efforts to deflect attention from and fact-finding efforts into the 
Rohingya crisis.  This follows a pattern of Japan’s behavior towards human rights 129
128 "World Report 2019: Japan," Human Rights Watch, January 17, 2019, 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/japan. 
129 Ibid. 
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abuses in other Asian states, such as continuing trade with China in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square protests, even as Western states called for sanctions.  130
This has a negative impact on human rights in East Asia. By allowing states and 
regimes to commit human rights violations without consequences from Japan, it 
demonstrates that these states will have support from a regional neighbor, and one which 
has strong relationships with the Western liberal democracies. This enables states with 
poor human rights records to continue their policies of abuse, which means that people in 
the region continue to be subjected to harmful policies that cause suffering. Japan’s 
demonstrated apathy towards human rights also means that democratization and human 
rights efforts in Asia are impeded, and without the support of a regional power, human 
rights can continue to be painted as a Western imposition of values on non-Western 
states. 
Nationalism plays a more roundabout role in influencing Japanese foreign policy 
around human rights, with both domestic and international factors. Abroad, Japan aims to 
more fully integrate itself as a member of the East Asian community, and establish itself 
as a regional leader.  This explains why Japan has often gone against the interests of its 131
Western allies in regards to the importance of human rights. By breaking with its Western 
allies, Japan places itself in an intermediary role between Asia and the West.  This has 132
included signing the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, which asserts that human rights are not 
130 David ​Arase, "Japanese Policy toward Democracy and Human Rights in Asia," ​Asian 
Survey​ 33, no. 10 (1993): 935-52, doi:10.2307/2645094, 943. 
131 Ibid., 948-49. 
132 Ibid. 
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universal, and should not be imposed on different cultures, in this case those of Asia.  133
Japan’s support for this perspective is not only part of its goal for regional leadership, but 
also a belief rooted in nationalist ideology. While Japan’s constitution asserts the 
importance of human rights several times, nationalists have long attempted to reverse that 
position. The LDP has held that  
Rights are gradually generated from the history, tradition, and culture of the  
community. Accordingly, human rights provisions need to be based on the 
history, culture, and tradition of our country. There are some provisions in the 
current constitution that could be viewed as being derived from the European idea 
that human rights are granted by God. We believe that these provisions need to be 
revised.  134
With this position, the LDP makes it clear that human rights should not be universally 
enforced, and that differences in culture allows for that position. Thus, Japan’s 
proclaimed support for human rights is not demonstrated, at least not fully, by the 
government’s policies and rhetoric.  
 
133 Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on 
Human Rights | ヒューライツ大阪, 
https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/other_documents/section1/1993/04/final-declaration-
of-the-regional-meeting-for-asia-of-the-world-conference-on-human-rights.html. 
134 Shigenori Matsui, "Fundamental Human Rights and ‘Traditional Japanese Values’: 
Constitutional Amendment and Vision of the Japanese Society," ​Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law​ 13, no. 1 (2018): 59-86, doi:10.1017/asjcl.2017.25, 74. 
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Nationalist Influence on Human Rights  
The combined effect of these policies in Japan is the diminished importance of 
human rights, not just for non-Japanese people but for all people in Japan. The ‘myth of 
homogeneity’ continues to be reinforced by narratives of Japan as a homogeneous nation 
that should remain so, such as the previously mentioned 2005 statement by Taro ​Aso. 
These narratives are successful, as the general population remains in favor of maintaining 
Japan’s ethnic homogeneity, based on various beliefs in the uniqueness of Japan.  The 135
policies for immigration and citizenship make it difficult to change these narratives by 
keeping non-Japanese people out of Japan or by limiting their ability to participate in 
society. The continuously low population of non-Japanese people reinforces general 
apathy among the general population with regard to minority issues, which allows for 
hate speech and racial discrimination to remain ingrained in society.  This spills over 136
into foreign affairs, where nationalists are able to dominate the discussions in relations 
with China and the Koreas over historical memory, as well as the importance of human 
rights in general in Japan’s international relations. All of this creates a reinforcing cycle 
in which the public’s apathy allows nationalists to exert influence over policies, which 
further feeds off of public apathy, and the nationalist narrative of traditional values limits 
the full realization of human rights in Japan.  
135 ​Harumi Befu, ​Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of 
Nihonjinron​, 139-141. 
136 Yuka ​Kitayama, "The Rise of the Far Right in Japan, and Challenges Posed for 
Education," ​London Review of Education ​16, no. 2 (2018): 250-67, 
doi:10.18546/lre.16.2.06​, 262 
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This influence is not limited only to policies that affect human rights. For 
example, over the years, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have been gradually given 
more and more responsibility and authority in response to various stimuli. In order to 
create the SDF in the 1950s, Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan from 
maintaining an armed forces, was interpreted as not denying the state the right to 
self-defense, and thus Japan has been able to maintain what is in essence an armed forces 
without the ability to operate outside the country. Initially, its primary responsibility was 
to assist in national emergencies or natural disasters. Since the 1990s, legislation has been 
passed allowing the SDF to participate in non-combat roles in UN peacekeeping missions 
and other engagements, such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which has caused controversy 
over the constitution. 
From one perspective, the expanded role of the SDF could mean that Japan could 
take on a more active role in humanitarian and human rights issues around the world. 
However, we have seen that Japan is not interested in protecting human rights as a 
cornerstone of its foreign policy. Rather, the gradual expansion of the SDF contributes to 
the weakening of Article 9 of the constitution. By reinterpreting Article 9, it opens the 
door to eventual repeal or amendment to the article and a remilitarized Japan. Whether 
Japan has the right to a military or not, the reality is that a new Japanese military would 
heighten tensions with China and the Koreas, still remembering the actions of the 
Japanese military during World War II. These steps are already being taken, with Abe’s 
 
Schoonover 86 
establishment of a marine force to “counter any invasion of Japan.”  The realization of 137
nationalist goals is not unrealistic so long as they remain in power. 
Nationalist influence in Japan exists in multiple forms, most obviously in the 
presence of nationalist organizations, such as Nippon Kaigi. As a network of multiple 
organizations, Nippon Kaigi has the furthest reach, with members of the Diet, and more 
importantly, the Cabinet, including the prime minister, counted among its membership. 
This provides a direct avenue for Nippon Kaigi to influence policy, when it has members 
or supporters in charge of the policymaking process. This also means that nationalist 
perspectives are constantly represented in national discussions on policies and society in 
general; Prime Minister Abe himself has consistently vocalized support for the 
organization. The way policymaking and elections work in Japan also allows Nippon 
Kaigi, as an organization, to be involved in the elections and votes of legislators. 
According to Daiki Shibuichi, Nippon Kaigi is actually not as influential of an 
organization as it is painted to be, particularly by Western media. He claims that Nippon 
Kaigi is not a united organization, but rather a conglomerate of separate branches and 
organizations with similar goals, and the apparent power of Nippon Kaigi stems from the 
overlap in ideology with Abe, as well as the decline of other organizations, particularly 
on the left. He also states that many Diet members join Nippon Kaigi for the sake of 
networking, rather than ideological alignment, and the overlapping ideology exists only 
137 ​"Japan Activates First Marines since World War II to Bolster Defenses against China," 
CNBC, April 07, 2018, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/07/japan-activates-first-marines-since-ww2-to-bolster-de
fenses-against-china.html. 
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on the far right of the LDP.  However, I argue that even if more context demonstrates 138
Nippon Kaigi to be less powerful than it is usually depicted, it still wields considerable 
influence over policy while the far right, led by Abe, remains in power. Even if that 
influence is not direct control of politicians, but rather alignment of goals, that still has a 
significant impact on policy-making, and Nippon Kaigi’s resources can be utilized 
towards realizing those goals in conjunction with the government. In addition, the fact 
that legislators join Nippon Kaigi despite not being ideologically aligned, simply for the 
sake of networking and resources, demonstrates that Nippon Kaigi has a significant 
amount of clout and resources, even if it could be replaced without Abe in power, as 
Shibuichi claims. More importantly, however, is the fact that nationalism is Japan is 
larger than just Nippon Kaigi and nationalist politicians. 
Japanese nationalism continues to exist today because it feeds off the 
ethnocentrist nationalist ideas that have their foundations in the Meiji era, and have been 
maintained throughout Japan’s modern history. These ideas, as previously described, do 
not maintain their influence because most Japanese people fervently believe in them; in 
fact most would not identify as nationalists, nor do nationalists generally enjoy national 
popularity. Rather, nationalist notions remain ingrained in Japan’s societal institutions. 
This is illustrated by the persistence of issues surrounding the Japanese identity, 
especially as it relates to ethnicity. The nationalist notions that established the policies 
surrounding citizenship and immigration policies, which were meant to maintain Japan’s 
ethnic homogeneity, remain popular in society, with a majority of people believing Japan 
138 ​Daiki Shibuichi, "The Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi): An Elusive Conglomerate," 
191-92. 
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should either maintain or reduce current levels of immigration.  Also, even if most 139
Japanese people do not participate in anti-minority hate speech or demonstrations, the 
fact remains that non-Japanese people continue to face ​widespread​ discrimination, when 
it comes to jobs, housing, marriage, etc., as detailed in Chapter 3. In addition, the fact that 
nationalist politicians, like Abe, continue to be reelected exemplifies that even if voters 
do not agree with their beliefs, it has not been enough of an issue to vote them out of 
office, even when they are unpopular. Taken together, all of these issues point to 
complacency and apathy of the general Japanese public when it comes to issues of 
nationalism, which allows those who are nationalists to continue to influence policies and 
society. 
 
Conclusion 
By looking at the effects of Japanese policies on various aspects of human rights, 
we can see that nationalism has a strong influence over Japanese politics and society. 
Japanese nationalism takes various forms in exerting this influence. Nationalism 
maintains a presence in Japanese society, passive though it may be. Nationalist 
individuals and organizations, like Shinzo Abe and Nippon Kaigi, however, are able to 
take advantage of this passive nationalism to exert direct influence over policy making, 
and by extension human rights in Japan. The direct ties between Nippon Kaigi and much 
of the LDP and Prime Minister Abe’s cabinet allow for the organization’s direct 
139 Bruce ​Stokes, Bruce and Kat Devlin, "Japanese Views on Immigrants, Immigration, 
Emigration," Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, November 12, 2018, 
https://www.pewglobal.org/2018/11/12/perceptions-of-immigrants-immigration-and-emi
gration/. 
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participation in the election and policy making processes, maintaining a public platform 
from which to promote their views. The combination of public apathy, or at the very least 
inaction, and an elite-dominated movement allows for nationalists to maintain their 
power and authority to continue to influence Japanese society.  
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Conclusion 
Taro Aso is not the only one who believes Japan is “one nation, one race,” 
although his view is the perfect summation of Japanese nationalist sentiment, what they 
believe Japan is and what they believe it should be. This thesis has demonstrated that 
even though the majority of the Japanese population does not adhere to right-wing 
nationalist ideology, that sentiment is still ingrained in Japanese society by virtue of an 
elite-centered movement, one part of the legacy of Japan’s modern history as a 
nation-state. History has nurtured nationalism through Japan’s high and low points, 
through victory and defeat in war, as well as economic boom and bust. In the current day, 
nationalism persists, represented by nationalist organizations and powerful individuals. 
More importantly, Japan’s political institutions allow for nationalism to exert influence 
over laws and policies, and those policies have implications for human rights both within 
Japan and out. 
This thesis started with the research question: ​How do nationalist organizations in 
Japan influence government policies related to human rights? The reality is, they are 
aided in large part by passivity of the Japanese population. Organizations, with the focus 
of this thesis on Nippon Kaigi, are able to directly involve itself in the policymaking 
process and in the election of Diet members. With Prime Minister Abe in power, Nippon 
Kaigi has even more clout that it normally would, with Diet members joining the 
organization not because of ideological alignment, but the resources and networking that 
it provides. This does not mean that it has achieved every one of its goals, but its 
viewpoints are constantly represented in national discussions on any related issue. The 
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lack of pushback from the general population only enables nationalists to continue to 
push their agenda and influence public discussion and opinion. This explains, at least in 
part, the policies, or lack thereof, that maintain the status quo of a homogeneous Japan. 
These same policies harm the human rights of non-Japanese people in Japan, as well as 
those in states that Japan enables to abuse human rights, and furthermore limit the full 
realization of human rights for all people in Japan. 
Of course, this thesis has its limitations. This is not a comprehensive analysis of 
the Japanese nationalist movement, nor does it cover every relevant piece of history or 
current event. It also does not address every possible impact of nationalism in Japanese 
society, or every issue pursued by the nationalist movement, such as their views on 
women and gender more generally. In addition, this thesis views the nationalist 
movement as a whole, and lacks interaction with individual nationalists, meaning that 
there are no directly stated opinions nor any reasoning behind or explanation for their 
beliefs beyond historical trends. This means that there is no way to conclude from this 
thesis why individuals are driven by nationalist ideologies, or what compels them to push 
their agenda on the entire nation. 
Rather, this thesis is meant to highlight the importance of nationalism in Japanese 
and that there is a relationship between it and human rights in Japan. By acknowledging 
the history and the significance of nationalism in Japanese society, the discussion can 
move past explanations based on culture. This is not to say that culture is not important, 
but culture can change, and indeed Japanese culture was changed through nationalism, 
and once again by the U.S. occupation after World War II. By chalking Japanese policies 
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up to culture, as many Western observers are wont to do, we ignore that possibility of 
change, as well as the agency of individuals within Japan. While they are relatively weak 
compared to nationalist organizations, there are organizations and individuals in Japan 
that are working to resist the nationalist narrative and promote human rights, such as 
branches of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, among others. 
When we move past culture as an explanation, it also opens opportunities to 
reframe debates around the universality of human rights. Japanese nationalists claim that 
human rights are not universal, and history and culture must be taken into account when 
expecting states to implement human rights. I agree. At the same time, however, I also 
believe that culture can change, or be changed. This is not to say that the West should 
impose human rights on every state and change the cultures of other nations. Instead, 
individuals can be given the chance to make those changes, and incorporate a system of 
human rights that acknowledges their importance within a society. This thesis details the 
processes by which elites in Japan have developed a national consciousness and policies 
to support it. With participation from the wider population, that national consciousness 
could be changed to affirm support for human rights as a Japanese value. 
In addition, this thesis can also be applied beyond Japan. The past few years have 
seen a revival of right-wing nationalism around the world, particularly in the liberal 
democracies of Europe and the United States. Much commentary from the media focuses 
on the events that are happening in this historical moment to explain this shift towards 
nationalism. I argue that it is just as important to understand the history and the roots of 
nationalism for any nation in order to bring us closer to understanding how to move past 
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these sentiments and move further towards the full realization of human rights around the 
world. This thesis brings a more in-depth historical analysis into the conversation, and 
thus provides more of an explanation for the roots of Japanese nationalism and the human 
rights issues that stem from it.  
Beyond the current status of nationalism and human rights in Japan, there lies 
another question: what can be done? A stronger anti-nationalist movement in Japan 
would serve as a counter against nationalist rhetoric and provide more viewpoints. More 
importantly, however, and as part of an anti-nationalist movement, is education. By 
educating the public with an unfiltered version of history, and an acknowledgement that 
nationalism has played a large role in modern Japan and remains influential, Japan can 
move past debate on what it means to be Japanese, and be more open to the idea that 
blood does not control one’s ability to participate in a nation. This also requires an 
acknowledgement of the diversity that already exists within Japan, both in terms of 
minorities and among Japanese people as well. This would not be a straightforward 
process, as conversations of this scale are invariably messy and complicated. Of course, it 
would certainly be made easier by a change in the government, but that remains unlikely 
without a stronger political alternative, and greater active participation from the general 
Japanese population. 
In the future, I believe that it would be beneficial for further research on the 
possibilities of building an anti-nationalist movement and a strengthening of the Japanese 
political left. In addition, I think that an in-depth sociological analysis of the Japanese 
nationalist movement would shed more light on the individual motivations of its 
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members, particularly the grassroots activists. By addressing these issues on a more 
individual level, it would be easier to determine what courses of action can be taken in 
order to minimize participation in the movement and to understand the factors specific to 
Japan that drive people to engage with nationalism. In addition, this research would 
benefit from more in depth analysis of the public discourse in Japan around the issues 
written about in this thesis. 
In 2017, ​Jacobin​ ran an article titled “Abe’s Japan is a Racist, Patriarchal Dream.” 
It calls for a transnational movement in order to resist the influence of nationalism and 
the racism and sexism it perpetuates.  I disagree, to a degree. Transnational solidarity is 140
important, and would certainly strengthen resistance to nationalist forces around the 
world. Before that, however, Japanese society needs to decide for itself that nationalism 
should be resisted, and human rights promoted. It needs to decide that as a whole, it 
wants to combat the racism and the xenophobia that remain ingrained in its national 
consciousness. As of now, it is evident that Japan has yet to move past the importance of 
race in the Japanese identity. This is not a decision that can be made for Japan by other 
states or nations, for any resulting change would have a weak standing and run the risk of 
another resurgence of nationalist sentiment. One day, however, maybe Japanese society 
will make that decision, and the myth of homogeneity be recognized as just that; a myth.  
140 Lisa ​Torio, "Abe's Japan Is a Racist, Patriarchal Dream," Jacobin, March 28, 2017, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/abe-nippon-kaigi-japan-far-right. 
 
Schoonover 95 
Bibliography 
Ambrose, Drew and and Sarah Yeo. "Kawasaki Hate Speech: The Rise of Japan's Far  
Right." Far Right | Al Jazeera. March 02, 2018.  
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/kawasaki-hate-speech-rise-japan-180
227114204341.html. 
 
Arase, David. "Japanese Policy toward Democracy and Human Rights in Asia." ​Asian  
Survey​ 33, no. 10 (1993): 935-52. doi:10.2307/2645094. 
 
"Aso Says Japan Is Nation of 'one Race'." The Japan Times. October 18, 2005.  
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2005/10/18/national/aso-says-japan-is-nation-
of-one-race/#.XJgujJhKhPZ. 
 
Befu, Harumi. ​Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron​.  
Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001. 
 
Bestor, Victoria Lyon., Akiko Yamagata, and Theodore C. Bestor. ​Routledge Handbook  
of Japanese Culture and Society​. Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Brown, Delmer M.. ​Nationalism in Japan​. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of  
California Press, 1955. 
 
Chan, Tara Francis. "NO ENTRY: How Japan's Shockingly Low Refugee Intake Is  
Shaped by the Paradox of Isolation, a Demographic Time Bomb, and the Fear of 
North Korea." Business Insider. April 11, 2018. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-japan-accepts-so-few-refugees-2018-4. 
 
Connor, Walker. "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ..." In  
Nationalism​, edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 36-46. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Den, Hitoki. "U.N. Charter's Anachronistic Enemy State Clauses." The Japan Times.  
January 19, 2017.  
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/01/19/commentary/japan-commentary
/u-n-charters-anachronistic-enemy-state-clauses/#.XLDhA-hKhPY. 
 
Denyer, Simon, and Akiko Kashiwagi. "Japan Passes Controversial New Immigration  
Bill to Attract Foreign Workers." The Washington Post. December 07, 2018. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japan-passes-controversial-new-immigrat
ion-bill-to-attract-foreign-workers/2018/12/07/a76d8420-f9f3-11e8-863a-897212
0646e0_story.html?utm_term=.078d9b8b235f. 
 
 
 
Schoonover 96 
Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human  
Rights | ヒューライツ大阪.  
https://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/other_documents/section1/1993/04/final-decl 
aration-of-the-regional-meeting-for-asia-of-the-world-conference-on-human-right 
s.html. 
 
Geertz, Clifford. "Primordial and Civic Ties" In ​Nationalism​, edited by John Hutchinson  
and Anthony D. Smith, 29-33. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. ​Nations and Nationalism​. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
 
Gordon, Andrew. ​A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa times to the Present​. 
New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Goto-Jones, Christopher. ​Modern Japan: A Very Short Introduction​. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2009.  
 
Guterres, António. "Opening Remarks at Press Conference with Prime Minister Shinzo  
Abe of Japan Secretary-General." United Nations. August 8, 2018. 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-08-08/remarks-press-confere
nce-prime-minister-shinzo-abe. 
 
Hara, Kimie. "50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s  
Territorial Problems." ​Pacific Affairs ​74, no. 3 (2001): 361-82. 
doi:10.2307/3557753. 
 
"Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, Refugees." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of  
Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/index.html. 
 
"Japan Activates First Marines since World War II to Bolster Defenses against China."  
CNBC. April 07, 2018. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/07/japan-activates-first-marines-since-ww2-to-bol
ster-defenses-against-china.html. 
 
"Japan's Economic Outlook in Five Charts." IMF. November 28, 2018.  
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/11/27/na112818-japans-economic-ou 
tlook-in-five-charts. 
 
Kitayama, Yuka. "The Rise of the Far Right in Japan, and Challenges Posed for  
Education." ​London Review of Education ​16, no. 2 (2018): 250-67. 
doi:10.18546/lre.16.2.06. 
 
 
 
 
Schoonover 97 
 
Kobayashi, Tetsuro, Christian Collet, Shanto Iyengar, and Kyu S. Hahn. "Who Deserves  
Citizenship? An Experimental Study of Japanese Attitudes Toward Immigrant  
Workers." ​Social Science Japan Journal​ ​18, no. 1 (2014): 3-22.  
doi:10.1093/ssjj/jyu035. 
 
"Koike Again Skips Eulogy for Koreans Killed after 1923 Quake：The Asahi Shimbun."  
The Asahi Shimbun. August 09, 2018. 
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201808090043.html. 
 
"Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of Female Population Ages 15-64) (modeled  
ILO Estimate)." The World Bank. September 2018.  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACTI.FE.ZS?end=2018&locations= 
JP-US&start=2010&view=chart. 
 
Lee, Yong Wook.​ "The Origin of One Party Domination: America’s Reverse Course and  
the Emergence of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan." ​The Journal of East 
Asian Affairs​ 18, no. 2 (2004): 371-413. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258199. 
 
Lie, John. ​Multiethnic Japan​. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
Matake, ​Kamiya. “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia.” In ​Japanese  
Foreign Policy Today​, edited by T. Inoguchi & P. Jain, 226-250. New York: 
Palgrave, 2000. 
 
Matsui, Shigenori. "Fundamental Human Rights and ‘Traditional Japanese Values’:  
Constitutional Amendment and Vision of the Japanese Society." ​Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law​ 13, no. 1 (2018): 59-86. doi:10.1017/asjcl.2017.25. 
 
Merler, Silvia. "Abenomics, Five Years In: Has It Worked?" World Economic Forum.  
January 10, 2018.  
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/abenomics-five-years-in-has-it-worked
. 
 
Mitchell, Richard. ​Thought Control in Prewar Japan​. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  
1976. 
 
Murakami, Sakura. "Japan Fails to Shine in Annual Report on Women's Participation in  
Politics." The Japan Times. March 7, 2018.  
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/07/national/japan-fails-shine-annual- 
report-womens-participation-politics/#.XJfX1ZhKhPY. 
 
Nakano, Koichi. "Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism." ​The  
Asia-Pacific Journal​, 6th ser., 14, no. 20 (October 15, 2016).  
https://apjjf.org/2016/20/Nakano.html. 
 
Schoonover 98 
 
 
Nikkei Staff Writers. "Meet Yuriko Koike -- Tokyo Governor, Leader of New Party of  
Hope." Nikkei Asian Review. September 26, 2017.  
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Meet-Yuriko-Koike-Tokyo-governor-leader-of-ne 
w-Party-of-Hope. 
 
Noble, Gregory W. "The Evolution of the Japanese Policymaking System." In ​The  
Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics​, edited by Alisa Gaunder, 249-60. New  
York: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Reed, ​Steven R. "The Liberal Democratic Party." In ​The Routledge Handbook of  
Japanese Politics​, edited by Alisa Gaunder, 14-23. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
 
Schreiber, Mark. "The Face of Immigration Is Rapidly Changing in Japan." The Japan  
Times. February 17, 2018.  
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/17/national/media-national/face-imm 
igration-rapidly-changing-japan/#.XIsIaqBKhPY. 
 
Shibuichi, Daiki. "The Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi): An Elusive Conglomerate."  
East Asia​ ​34, no. 3 (2017): 179-96. doi:10.1007/s12140-017-9274-1. 
 
Smith, Anthony D.. ​Myths and Memories of the Nation​. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
1999.  
 
Stockwin, J. A. A. ​Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy​. Oxford:  
Blackwell, 2008. 
 
Stokes, Bruce, and Kat Devlin. "Japanese Views on Immigrants, Immigration,  
Emigration." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. November 12, 
2018. 
https://www.pewglobal.org/2018/11/12/perceptions-of-immigrants-immigration-a
nd-emigration/. 
 
Tanaka, Chisato. "Japan's Refugee-screening System Sets High Bar." The Japan Times.  
May 21, 2018. 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/05/21/reference/japans-refugee-screenin
g-system-sets-high-bar/#.XJPDGKBKhPY. 
 
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN.  
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.h 
tml. 
 
THE NATIONALITY LAW, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html. 
 
 
Schoonover 99 
Torio, Lisa. "Abe's Japan Is a Racist, Patriarchal Dream." Jacobin. March 28, 2017.  
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/03/abe-nippon-kaigi-japan-far-right. 
"UN Security Council - Profile." BBC News. August 24, 2017.  
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-11712448. 
 
UNESCO World Heritage​ ​Centre. "Japan." UNESCO World Heritage Centre.  
https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/jp. 
Waswo, Ann. ​Modern Japanese Society, 1868-1994​. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1996. 
 
Weiss, Andrew. "Towards a Beautiful Japan: Right-Wing Religious Nationalism in  
Japan's LDP" (2018). Student Work. 7. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/ceas_student_work/7 
 
"World Report 2019: Japan." Human Rights Watch. January 17, 2019.  
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/japan. 
 
